

Psyche, Corporeality and Consciousness: A Buddhist Analysis of Individual in Refuting a Lasting Self—as Viewed in the Pali Canon

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The Pali canon divides the five aggregates which constitute the individual into three: consciousness, psyche and corporeality. However, the popular Theravāda Buddhist tradition disregards this division and divides the five into two: name and form, thinking that the two contains the five. In this article, I maintain that the popular Theravāda division of name and form, though unintentionally, excludes the aggregate of consciousness and in turn describes a person without consciousness. In my view, the threefold division is important to understand the Buddhist concept of individual because Buddhism finds the fundamental human problem that it tries to remedy, not in physical body nor even in consciousness, but within psyche. The main point of this article is to show and analyze this threefold division of individual and to bring out the importance of such an analysis.

パーリ語仏典は人間存在を構成する集合体（五陰）を分けて意識・靈魂・身体の三つとした。しかし、上座部仏教はこの分類を軽視し、五陰を名目と形状の二つに分け、この二つに五陰全体が含まれると考えた。本稿は名目と形状という通常上座部が行なう二つの分類は、意図的ではないが、五陰の内の意識を排除し、その結果人間を意識を持たぬ者としていると論じるものである。私見によればこの三分類は仏教が人間存在をどのように理解しているかを理解する上で重要である。というのは仏教は人間の根本的問題を発見し、靈魂・身体からでなく、まさに意識から問題の解決を目指したからである。本稿が課題とするのは、人間存在の上述の三分類をまず示し、それを分析してその分析の重要性を明らかにしようとするものである。

Introduction

The aim of this article is to present the Buddhist concept of the individual based on the Pali canon by examining the five aggregates: corporeality, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness. The popular Theravāda tradition is in the habit of dividing the five aggregates into name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) but in this article I suggest that division is misleading and unfounded. I maintain that the five aggregates are divided in the canon not into two: name and form but into psyche (*nāma*), corporeality (*rūpa*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). I will also argue that the twofold division into name and form unconsciously excludes the aggregate of consciousness. In the threefold division of individual, psyche refers to three of the aggregates: feeling, perception and formations; corporeality—which means the four great elements and the form which depends on them—refers to the aggregate of corporeality. Consciousness—which differs from both psyche and corporeality—is the aggregate of consciousness. I will maintain that these three—corporeality, psyche, and consciousness—are interrelated and interdependent and that both psyche and consciousness constitute the mind of the individual and corporeality his physical body.

It is important to recognize this threefold division in understanding the Buddhist concept of individual, his mind, body, bondage, and also his liberation because the Pali Buddhism identifies the fundamental human problem that it tries to remedy, not in physical body nor even in consciousness, but within the psyche of the individual. All evil properties known as cankers, fetters, possessions, attachments, defilements and hindrances are centered in the psyche. These evil properties permeate all of the three because they all are interdependent and interrelated. It is possible to purify one's psyche; and it is by purifying the psyche from evil properties that one can become an arahant (a liberated person) here and now. After the attainment of liberation, the arahant lives in the world until he attains complete nibbāna (*parinibbāna*) with the complete dissolution of psyche with death. With the disappearance of psyche, consciousness disappears (*anidassana*) and that person's corporeality turns into a dead body.

Considering the importance of this threefold division of the five aggregates in understanding the individual, his bondage and his release, I begin this article with the following thesis: the Pali canon, when it speaks of the individual and his bondage and release, presupposes such a division with the aim of refuting a lasting self. [Throughout this article I use the pronoun he for brevity, clarity and convenience without any pejorative.] Although references to this threefold division have already been made by several Buddhologists in the past, so far a complete examination into it or a recognition of the importance of such an establishment has never been made. Therefore, this article is an attempt to bring out an important point for scholarly discussion.

No-self

The Pali Buddhism names each individual being whether human or animal or even divine as a *satta*, the entangled, a word derived from the verbal root *sañj*. One is called *satta* because of being caught (*satta*) and held fast (*visatta*) by desire, attachment, lust, craving for the five aggregates (SN III, 188). Buddhaghosa, a fifth century Theravāda commentator, also says that beings are called *satta*: "because they are entangled, fast entangled through lust and desire concerned with the five aggregates" (Vism, 310). Conceived in this way, a being is one who craves for and clings to the five aggregates by means of enjoyment received through the senses. In brief, a being is one who clings to itself. The word *satta* is then used in Pali Buddhism to denote all sorts of beings including humans, gods, animals and even the Buddha-to-be (*bodhisatta*). They all are *sattas* because they all enjoy the pleasures of the senses and, in turn, are bound to the cycle of birth, death and rebirth (*samsāra*). They all perceive through their senses and become attached to the perceived objects. It is the nature of worldly beings to go after sense objects and grasp them. This nature of the *satta* creates in him a sense of *I, my, and mine*, or of an independent individual existence. In turn, this individual being perceives the world in terms of his ego. This misperception leads him to further conceptualization, confusion and, as a result, suffering. And it is to this confused and suffering individual that the Buddha teaches his liberating doctrine showing that this confusion and suffering of the individual is a product of his own belief in the existence of a lasting self within himself.

The Pali Buddhism thus defines the individual as one with no individuality. The individual is a combination of many different things and there is no place for him to wander around with a notion of *I*. The Pali canon makes this point clear when it analyzes the person into material and immaterial; into corporeality, psyche and consciousness; into five aggregates; and into six senses; and so on. The purpose of these varying analyses is to encourage the person to become dispassionate towards oneself because, as it is said in the canon, it is only by being dispassionate that one lusts not for *I*; and it is by not lusting that one becomes free. In order to achieve freedom from suffering one has to give up lusting for *I*. This has to be done by realizing the reality of the five aggregates that constitute a person and produce the notion of *I*. One must use one's cognitive aspect to reduce one's affective burden. Lusting is seen as the force that binds the five aggregates together, giving to the person a sense of *I, my, and mine*. The person, then, is viewed in Pali Buddhism as a coming together of two basic immaterial and material elements, due to causes and conditions, in the form of five aggregates or in the form of psyche, corporeality and consciousness. That which is conditioned is subject to change. Bondage of the individual is due to his own process of craving and clinging and his own perception and conceptualization. In brief, the arising and passing away of suffering discussed in Pali Buddhism is of an ever-becoming person who is in a constant change and transformation subject to various karmic and contextual causes and conditions.

According to a Buddhist interpretation the five aggregates that constitute the individual are in constant change and transformation. Pali Buddhism also denies the existence of an eternal self after considering this ongoing change and transformation of the individual. The reality of what we call mind is that one moment arises and another ceases continually both day and night. Further this process of change in the mind is said to be faster than that of the body. Everything is subject to change. Therefore, the Buddha's response to Heraclitus—who said: "You cannot step twice into the same river, for fresh waters are ever

flowing in upon you"—would be "if you step twice into the same river, would you be the same you both times?" In other words, Heraclitus describes the process of change in the object, but the Buddha describes the process of change in both the subject and the object or, put another way, in everything. Once one understands his own nature, he understands the nature of everything.

The process of change and transformation happens according to a universal law of dependent origination which is the central principle on which the whole of other Buddhist teachings are based. The basic theory is: When this is, that is; when this is not, that is not; due to the arising of this, that arises, due to the ceasing of this, that ceases. This principle is used to explain the arising and ceasing of suffering of the individual (Ud, 2-3):

What is the noble truth of the arising of suffering? Conditioned by ignorance the activities come to be; conditioned by the activities, consciousness; conditioned by consciousness, psycho-corporeality; conditioned by psycho-corporeality, the sixfold sphere of sense; conditioned by the sixfold sphere of sense, contact; conditioned by contact, feeling; conditioned by feeling, craving; conditioned by craving, grasping; conditioned by grasping, becoming; conditioned by becoming, birth; conditioned by birth, old age and death, sorrow, grief, woe, lamentation and despair come to pass. This is the arising of the whole mass of suffering.

What is the noble truth of the making suffering to cease? From the utter fading out and ending of ignorance comes the ending of the activities; from the ending of the activities, the ending of consciousness; from the ending of consciousness . . . and so on . . . comes the ending of this whole mass of suffering (AN I, 176).

In accordance with this universal principle, existence always means a conditioned existence; things exist depending on each other. Further, this conditioned existence in its true sense is nothing but change and transformation itself.

All of the five aggregates that constitute a person are conditioned; hence, transitory; hence unsatisfactory. That which is transitory, miserable and liable to change, Pali Buddhism maintains, is not suitable and logically sound enough to be regarded as an eternal self. The Buddha often talked to the monks, "Therefore, monks, I say, whatsoever corporeality, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness, past, present, or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, should be looked upon as, "This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self". The mental and physical things that exist either as a world or in the world are already conditioned things. Through our sense perceptions as clinging beings, we transform those conditioned things in terms of concepts. Hence, to perceive even the collectivity of the five aggregates which constitute a conventional being as a static being or *I*, is an erroneous perception. In other words, this erroneous perception is a result of mental transformation of the conditioned.

If one investigates and carefully analyzes each of the five aggregates, he will find in them only the emptiness or nothingness because, in the ultimate sense, nothing exists independently. One may easily be able to realize this empty nature by understanding, for example, the dependent nature of the sound of a lute. Once the Buddha said (SN IV, 196-198):

Let us suppose, monks, that there is a king or a king's chief minister who has never heard the sound of a lute. Then, on hearing the sound for the first time, he says: "Good man, what is that sound, so exciting, so beautiful, so intoxicating, so entrancing, so captivating?" And they say to him: "It is the sound, sire, of what is called a lute. . . ." Thereupon he says: "Go and bring me that lute". They bring it to him, saying: "This, Sire, is that lute, the sound of which is so exciting . . . so captivating". But he rejoins: "Away with the lute, my man! just bring me that sound". Then they say to him: "This which is called a lute, sire, is made of its various parts, a great number of parts. It is because of its various parts, that it makes a sound; that is to say, owing to the belly, sounding board, arm, head, strings, plectrum and the effort of a man's fingers . . ." The king or the king's chief minister then breaks up the lute into ten or a hundred pieces. Having broken it up he splinters it further, burns it in a fire and reduces it to ashes. Having reduced it to ashes he winnows the ashes in a strong wind or lets them be borne away on the swift current of a river. And he says: "A poor thing is this that you call a lute, my man, whatever the so-called lute may be. People have been infatuated and led astray by it for too long". The Buddha then said, "Just in this way, monks, a monk investigates corporeality as far as corporeality goes; he investigates feeling . . . perception . . . formations . . . consciousness as far as consciousness goes. So investigating whatever there may be, there is for him no *I* or *mine* or *I am* in it".

In brief, in reality, as captured by our erroneous perception, there is not any static person who thinks, speaks, and acts. There exist only the five groups of conditioned active processes that are always transforming by themselves into something different. Based on this Buddhist analysis, there are no nouns in the world, only verbs. However, if nouns are used they must be such ing-nouns as feeling, suffering, and going. Through nouns people unconsciously try to substantialize and make static changing processes. By using nouns people demonstrate their erroneous construction of static in the changing.

The Bhâram sutta of the SN III, 25-6 has become controversial because it identifies the five aggregates as a burden (*bhâra*) and the carrier of this burden as the person (*puggala*). Thomas (1933: 100) says that this sutta had often been used by the Pudgalavâdins to support their proposition that "an individual exists in the sense of being real or true in the highest sense". Commenting on "person" and referring to this sutta, Stcherbatsky (1970: 71) too points out that this sutta "where *pudgala* is compared with the bearer and the *skandhas* with the burden, was invoked as a proof that the Buddha himself admitted some reality of the *pudgala*. For all the other Buddhist schools *pudgala* was but another name for *âtman*, and they refuted both theories by the same arguments". This view of "person" in the sense of the self is also refuted in the Points of Controversy (pp. 8-63), a Theravâda text, now part of the canon. It must be noted that in the Bhâram sutta, the person is identified not in the sense of a self but as an empirical being. The person is defined as "that venerable one of such and such a name, of such and such a family". With reference to this, Steven Collins (1982: 165) says that "here we have the same words which denoted the 'individuality' in the memory of former lives—clearly the 'person' here is equally a matter of conventional truth". He says that this sutta must be rendered as "the bearing of the burden" not as "the bearer of the burden". In supporting his thesis, Collins says that there are two possibilities of the use of the term *hâra* in both Pali and Sanskrit. One is as an adjective, meaning "someone 'carrying' something". The other is as a noun, meaning "'the act of carrying' something". In this Bhâram sutta, says Collins (165), "the compound *bhârahâra* is almost certainly a noun, since it appears in a list of three compounds of which the first two are definitely neuter nouns. The idea, then, is that the 'person' is a state created by the act of 'picking up' the burden of the *khandhâ*, through desire, a state which simply consists in the act of 'bearing the burden'". Although the term *hâra* is an agent noun, meaning, "bearer", I think, Collins is correct in rendering the compound *bhârahâra* as "the bearing of the burden". In the Bhâram sutta, it is the grasping nature of the person that is explained in terms of "taking up of the burden" (*bhâra-âdâna*). What is this "taking up of the burden"? The sutta continues, "It is that craving that leads downwards to rebirth, along with the lure and the lust that lingers longingly, now here, now there: namely, the craving for sensual pleasure, the craving for existence, and the craving for non-existence". It is clear here that "taking up of the burden" is used to define the craving, an affective function of the individual.

According to Buddhist analysis, the whole world, both animate and inanimate, internal and external, is nothing but a series of processes which are in constant change and transformation. In his Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa quotes another authority: "For there is suffering, but none who suffers; doing exists, although there is no doer; extinction is, but no extinguished person; although there is a path, there is no goer". As it is depicted in the Vajirâ sutta (SN I, 135), the nun Vajirâ replies to Mâra, "In this connection, a being is not got at, for just as when the parts are rightly set, the word 'chariot' exists, thus when the aggregates of grasping are, there is the agreed usage of 'being.' None apart from suffering arises, no other than suffering ceases". By these examples, it is clear that, in the Buddhist perspective, what exists as a person or an individual is this conscious-psycho-physical pentad which is in constant change and transformation. Hence, for Buddhists, belief in an eternal self within the individual or in all phenomena is a cognitive error.

The Corporeality of the Individual

The five aggregates that constitute a person consist of corporeality (*rûpa*), feeling (*vedanâ*), perception (*saññâ*), formations (*sankhâra*) and consciousness (*viññâna*). In discussing these five, the Pali canon assumes a threefold division: psyche (feeling,

perception, formations), corporeality and consciousness. Following is a discussion on each aggregate in relation to the threefold division.

Corporeality (*rūpa*)

The aggregate of corporeality constitutes the living physical body of the individual. The Pali word for corporeality is *rūpa*. The SN III, 86 defines it etymologically: it is called *rūpa* in the sense of "it is afflicted" (*ruppatti*) by cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and coming into contact with gnats, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and snakes. This definition shows that what Buddhism calls corporeality is not just an insensitive body of matter but the sensitive corporeality of a living being. It shows also the emotional reactions of a living physical body in the face of cold, hunger and the like. Examining the meaning of *rūpa*, Y. Karunadasa (1967: 11), a Buddhist scholar on this subject, says that the term is used in "a subjective sense, i.e., as referring to certain organic affections".

In the SN III, 59, corporeality is viewed in terms of "the four great elements (*mahābhūta*)—earth, water, fire, and wind—and that corporeality based on them" (*upādāyarūpa*). This corporeality, says the text, arises with the arising of food (*āhāra*), and it ceases with the cessation of food. Conceived in this way, the word corporeality then stands for a growing and ceasing living physical body, supported by food, which consists of four great elements and also the corporeality derived from the four great elements. Johansson (1979: 30) correctly recognizes this definition as about the human body. It is important here to understand what the four great elements are. According to Guenther (1974: 146), the proper rendering of *mahābhūta* here should be the four "great elementary qualities" rather than "great elements". He says that "'earth' is the symbolic expression for all that is solid and able to carry a load, 'water' for all that is fluid and cohesive, 'fire' for all that is warm or has temperature, and 'air' for all that is light and moving". This means that the four great elements are not just limited to the human corporeality and the human corporeality is not just limited to the four great elements. It must also be noted here that in the Buddhist definition, corporeality includes also the corporeality that is derived from the four great elements. This means that corporeality (*rūpa*) is always more than the four great elements that people collectively take as matter.

What is the difference between corporeality and matter? In comparing the concept of *rūpa* (Corporeality) and that of matter in the Western sense, Lama Anagarika Govinda (1969: 67) says, the concept of *rūpa* is much wider than the concept of matter. He says that *rūpa* which literally means "form" or "shape" does not indicate whether "this form is material or immaterial, concrete or imagined, apprehended by the senses (sensuous) or conceived by the mind (ideal)". He says further that,

The expression *rūpaskandha* . . . has been rendered generally, as "corporeal group", "material aggregate", "aggregate of bodily form", etc.—while in terms like *rūpāvacaracitta*, "consciousness of the realm of form", or *rūpadhyāna* (Pali: *jhāna*), the state of spiritual vision in meditation, *rūpa* signifies an awareness of pure, immaterial or ideal form. Worlds (*loka*) or realms (*avacara*) of existence corresponding to those ideal forms, have been called "fine-material spheres" (*rūpāvacara*), but since they are invisible to the human eye and are only perceived clairvoyantly, they certainly do not correspond to our human concept of materiality nor to that of physics.

Guenther points out the error of rendering the term *rūpa* as "matter", a term which is commonly employed by the Buddhologists. Johansson (1979:30) too says that "*rūpa* is not altogether 'material'" in the Western sense. In *Body and Mind*, presenting, perhaps, a Western sense of the term 'body', Keith Campbell (1970: 2) says,

Provided you know who you are, it is easy to say what your body is: it is what the undertakers bury when they bury you. It is your head, trunk, and limbs. It is the collection of cells consisting of your skin and all the cells inside it. It is the assemblage of flesh, bones, and organs which the anatomist anatomizes. It is the mass of matter whose weight is your weight.

A Buddhist textual definition that comes close to this Western interpretation can be found in the MN I, 90. According to this definition, "a space or sky that is enclosed by bones, sinews, flesh, and skin is known as corporeality".

It seems, however, that the Western idea of matter comprehends only the four great elements described in Buddhist and other Indian analyses. Therefore, the comparison should

be made between Western matter and the Indian four great elements, not between Western matter and the Buddhist concept of corporeality. In other words, corporeality in Buddhism is always more than the four great elements; hence, more than matter. Corporeality is something formed in a living being with the mutual influence of the consciousness and the psyche.

Some Buddhist scholars such as Otto Rosenberg and Lama Anagarika Govinda have rendered the term *rūpa* as "the sensuous". This interpretation, Govinda (1969: 66) points out, "includes the concept of matter from a psychological point of view, without establishing a dualistic principle, in which matter becomes the absolute opposite of mind". Paul Griffiths (1986: 108), too, correctly identifies this when he says, "Buddhist intellectuals were not, when discussing the mind-body problem, considering the possible relations between qualitatively different substances—as, for instance, was Descartes". For Rene Descartes (1596-1650), according to the *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (337), both body and mind were substances, but with utterly different basic natures: "Body is extended and unthinking; mind is thinking and unextended. Of the two concepts, that of body was the more original and enduring". In this sense the mind-body problem in Buddhism is not a problem in the Western sense. In the Buddhist sense, the mind and the body are interrelated and interdependent. Since the mind, according to Buddhism, is a combination of the mental functions called psyche (*nāma*), consciousness (*viññāna*), sensory-mind (*manas*), and the receptacle-mind (*citta*), it is more than thinking. Without the mind, that is, psyche and consciousness, there is no independent existence of corporeality. Supporting and nourishing each other, both body and mind manifest as a human being. The arising of the one is also the arising of the other.

Psyche (*nāma*) of the individual

Included in psycho-corporeality are the aggregates of corporeality, feeling, perception and formations. Among the four, feeling, perception and formations constitute an individual's psyche (*nāma*). It is interesting to note that these three are also the factors which constitute receptacle-mind (*citta*) because feeling and perception are clearly identified in the canon as its activities (*citta-sankhāra*). In addition, formations (*sankhāra*) are explained in terms of *cetanā*, meaning "deliberation", which is an activity of receptacle-mind. Conceived this way, all the three aggregates that constitute psyche also constitute the functions of the receptacle-mind. This leads us to conclude that receptacle-mind and psyche (*nāma*) are identical. Seen this way, the functions of receptacle-mind or psyche create, influence, direct, and disrupt the activities of consciousness. They affect corporeality as well. That is to say, consciousness and receptacle-mind or psyche mutually depend on each other. The statement that consciousness depends on psycho-corporeality and vice versa, therefore means that consciousness depends on receptacle-mind and corporeality and vice versa. Thus we can see, on the one hand, an identity between receptacle-mind and psyche and, on the other hand, a difference between receptacle-mind and consciousness.

Feeling (*vedanā*)

Among the factors of psyche, feeling is a factor that represents the affective tone of the individual. Feeling (*vedanā*), the SN III, 86-7 states, is so called in the sense "it is felt" (*vediyati*). Pleasure, pain, and neutral feeling are the things that are felt. Elsewhere feeling is defined (SN III, 59-60) in terms of six bodies. The six consist of feelings born of contact with eye, ear, nose, tongue, body (skin), and sensory-mind (*manas*). These six types of feelings, it is said, arise owing to the arising of contact, and they cease owing to the ceasing of contact. It is said that feeling comes because of contact between the senses and the sense objects: with the arising of contact comes the arising of feeling. This mutual dependency is clearly expressed in the following *paticcasamuppāda* formula as well: "depending on contact Feeling comes to be" (*phassa paccayā vedanā*) (AN I, 176). In addition, the Pali canon speaks of a threefold feeling: pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral. Feeling is also listed in the SN IV, 232 as fivefold: pleasure, pain, joy, grief, and neutrality. These different types of feelings are due to differences in contact. For instance, the pleasant feeling comes because of one's sense contact with something pleasant (SN II, 97).

Perception (*saññā*)

The affective tone of the individual is expressed in terms of the aggregate of feeling. Similarly, his cognitive tone can be seen in the aggregate of perception (*saññā*). In defining perception and giving the etymology for its name, the SN III, 87 says, "It is identified (*saññānāti*), therefore it is called perception". The text continues in explaining what is identified: "Blue is identified, yellow is identified, red is identified, white is identified". In addition to this, perception is also defined (SN III, 60) in terms of some six bodies: perception of sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and mental images. It is also said that, just as in the case of feeling, perception arises with the arising of contact and it ceases with the ceasing of contact.

Formations (*sankhāra*)

In defining the factor of formations (*sankhāra*) in its etymological sense, the SN III, 87 states: "They transform (super-form) that which is already formed and conditioned (*sankhatam abhisankharonti*), therefore, they are called formations". The text then goes on to introduce the formed and the conditioned and the way they are being transformed or reformed. Accordingly, the individual or, in this case, *I* transforms "corporeality as it is my corporeality (*rūpam rūpattāya*), feeling as it is my feeling, perception as it is my perception, formations as they are my formations, consciousness as it is my consciousness". This process of transforming reality must be stopped in order to achieve liberation from the cycle of rebirth as it is the process by which karmic fuel for the journeying-on (*samsāra*) is produced. In addition, formations are also defined (SN III, 60) in terms of six bodies of deliberation (*cetanā*). The six are the deliberation for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and mental images. Again, it is with the arising of contact that formations come, and with the ceasing of contact formations cease. Thus all sorts of willful, intentional, or deliberative activities are named as formations. As will be discussed later, one of the five factors of psyche (*nāma*) listed in the Sammāditthi sutta (MN I, 53) is deliberation (*cetanā*) and in this context the factor of formations (*sankhāra*) is not mentioned. Therefore, in that context, I assume that deliberation (*cetanā*) stands for the aggregate of formations. The above definitions of formations are also in line with my assumption and they show deliberation represents nothing but the aggregate of formations.

In the canon, we can find a variety of formations. Thus formations can be meritorious, demeritorious, imperturbable, respiration, discursive thinking, applied thinking, perception, feeling, ego-formations regarding the five aggregates, or the will for six sense objects. Consciousness therefore comes to be and continues to exist in different forms because of these diverse formations which can be summarized under the general term psychocorporeality.

Among the variety of formations, karma-formations are threefold: meritorious, demeritorious and imperturbable (SN II, 82-4). One produces these karma-formations because of one's ignorance. When an ignorant produces meritorious-formations, his consciousness bends towards the meritorious; when he produces demeritorious-formations, his consciousness bends towards the demeritorious; and when he produces imperturbable-formations, his consciousness bends towards the imperturbable. This means that karma-formations guide the direction of one's consciousness. Hence, when one's ignorance disappears with the emergence of wisdom, he does not produce karma-formations; hence he does not grasp anything in the world; because of his non-grasping nature, he attains complete nibbāna (*parinibbāyati*), becomes an arahant. Such an arahant does not form meritorious-, demeritorious-, or even imperturbable-formations. Because of the absence of formations, consciousness does not get directed and it cannot be found in an arahant. Where one's consciousness cannot be found, there his psycho-corporeality, and in turn everything else, disappears because psycho-corporeality and consciousness exist reciprocally. Where one is not, the other is not as well.

Activity-formations are also three in kind: physical-formations, verbal-formations and mental-formations of the receptacle-mind. Physical-formations are respiration; verbal-formations are discursive thinking (reasoning) and applied thinking (deliberating); and formations of the receptacle-mind are perception and feeling. Consciousness, accordingly, is also directed by these activity-formations.

Ego-formations are the formations of *my* and *mine*. They are also known as mental proliferations (*papañca-saññā-sankhā*). According to the SN III, 87, all of the five aggregates are subject to ego-formations. These five are re-formed/transformed to be *my* and *mine*, that is, my corporeality, my feeling and so forth.

Sensory-formations are six in kinds: deliberation for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touches, and mental images (SN III, 87). These sensory-formations occur because of sensory contacts. Therefore, with no sensory contacts, they are not to be found.

The Consciousness (*Viññāna*) of the Individual

The aggregate of consciousness is the consciousness of the individual, and it always depends on psycho-corporeality (*nāma-rūpa*) or on the other four aggregates: corporeality, feeling, perception and formations. In the SN III, 87, consciousness is explained in the sense of cognitive discrimination. This is in accordance with its etymology. "And why, monks, do you say consciousness?" asks the Buddha, "It cognizes (*viñānāti*), monks, therefore, it is called consciousness (*viññāna*). What does it cognize? It cognizes sour and bitter, acid and sweet, alkaline and non-alkaline, salty and non-salty". Again, consciousness is defined in the SN III, 61 in terms of six bodies. According to this, consciousness appears as eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, skin-consciousness and sensory-mind-consciousness.

The sensory function of consciousness is the sphere of sensory and perceptive awareness. It is our "sensing". The MN I, 53-54 depicts this sensory function of consciousness in terms of the above named six bodies of consciousness. Each of these six types of consciousness has been named after the basis on which it operates. Consciousness, too, comes to be conditionally. Without conditions it does not come to be (MN I, 256-257). According to SN III, 61, it is with the arising of psycho-corporeality (*nāma-rūpa*) that the arising of consciousness comes, and with the ceasing of the former, the latter also ceases. Consciousness means being conscious of something. This means that without an object (*ārammana*), consciousness does not arise or become established (*patitthā*). Given an object, it arises conditioned by that object. Therefore, the nature of consciousness at any given time is determined by the nature of its object. As such, it gets the names of eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, et cetera. In the canon, this is clearly shown in the story of Sāti. According to the story, a monk by the name of Sāti had misunderstood consciousness, assuming it to be something permanent, something which travels from one life to the next without change (*tadevidam viññānam sandhāvati samsarati anaññam*) (MN I, 258). He had also assumed that consciousness enjoys the results of good and bad actions (MN I, 258). The Buddha corrected his misunderstanding by explaining that consciousness arises due to causes and conditions; hence it arises dependently; without conditions, the arising of consciousness does not happen (MN I, 258). Just as fire is named from that in dependence on which it burns—for example, log-fire, chip-fire, grass-fire, cowdung-fire, husk-fire, and rubbish-fire—in the same way, consciousness is named from that in dependence on which it comes into being.

What is rejected in the sutta where Sāti is blamed for holding a view that consciousness continues is the idea that this same consciousness, not another, continues. This suggests that Sāti mistook consciousness as a lasting self. As recorded in SN IV, 166-7, answering a question asked by Ven. Udāyin, Ven. Ānanda once clarified a method by which the Buddha had explained to him that this consciousness is without a self (*anattā*). "Owing to the eye and object arises the eye-consciousness, does it not, friend?" "Yes, friend." "Well, if the condition, if the cause of the arising of the eye-consciousness should altogether, in every way, utterly come to cease without remainder, would any eye-consciousness be evident?" "Surely no, friend!". Similarly, through this dialogue, Ānanda showed the dependent nature of the sensory function of the consciousness based on the six senses. Then he concluded, "Well, friend, it is by this method that the Blessed One has explained, opened up, and shown that this consciousness is without a self".

In the story of Sāti, under the category of consciousness, the Buddha has explained six aspects of the sensory function of consciousness based on the six senses (MN I, 259). In the Chachakka sutta, these six aspects are mentioned in terms of six bodies of consciousness. They are so called depending on their respective base of arising. For instance, the visual

aspect of consciousness arises regarding material shapes on the basis of eye; the auditory aspect of consciousness arises regarding sounds on the basis of the ear; the olfactory aspect of consciousness arises regarding smells on the basis of nose; the gustatory aspect of consciousness arises regarding tastes on the basis of tongue; the bodily aspect of consciousness arises regarding touching on the basis of the body; and the sensory-mind aspect of consciousness arises regarding the mental states on the basis of the sensory-mind (MN III, 281). Padmasiri de Silva says that "*viññāna* in these contexts may be rendered as cognitive consciousness" (1979: 19). Because I take consciousness as having many aspects, I identify this aspect as the sensory function of consciousness.

The arising of consciousness of external objects on the basis of internal sense faculties is highly important for the understanding of bondage as well as freedom. The occurrence of the coming together of consciousness, external objects, and internal senses is the arising of contact. It is on the basis of this contact that feeling arises. Then, depending on feeling, craving arises (MN III, 281-282). The arising of craving means the arising of bondage. It is through the eradication of craving that one becomes free. In this sense, the sensory aspect of consciousness plays a significant role in the process of *samsāra* and *nibbāna* (SN II, 72).

Functions of Consciousness

Various formations are the causes for various functions of consciousness. Accordingly, the function of consciousness can be divided into Karma-based, activity-based, ego-based, and sensory-based. Although these functions are of the same consciousness, they are distinguishable and identifiable and help us to identify different aspects of consciousness. Karma-based functions are always fueled by either meritorious-, demeritorious- or imperturbable-formations. They help consciousness to grow and migrate from one life to another. Activity-based functions, supported by physical, verbal, and mental activities (of *citta*), are a life force without which life ends or temporarily ends as in the case of the cessation of perception and feeling. The mental activities of the receptacle-mind are feeling and perception. These activities can be regarded as the inner functions of one's consciousness by whose support one feels, perceives, knows, discriminates, and understands. When the SN III, 87 describes consciousness as that which cognizes, recognizes, knows, understands, and discriminates, it seems to presuppose these various functions of consciousness. The text says that it is called consciousness because it recognizes the taste of salty, sweet, and sour.

Although perception and feeling are introduced in the canon as activities of receptacle-mind, the two also have a close connection with consciousness. For instance, it is said in the MN I, 293 that feeling, perception and consciousness are associated, not dissociated because what one feels one identifies, what one identifies one discriminates. Thus the activity-based function of consciousness is the basic inner consciousness or awareness. One becomes conscious of the world and gets knowledge about it through the sensory-based functions of consciousness or sensory functions of consciousness. The worldly person misunderstands the five aggregates because of the consciousness based on ego-formations. With enlightenment or wisdom-freedom, the rebirth linking functions of consciousness disappear, but the cognitive and sensory functions of consciousness continue until the enlightened one's death. In the attainment of the temporary cessation of perception and feeling, one's physical, verbal, and mental activities based on receptacle-mind cease to exist and with the re-emerging from that state, he regains them; that is, his sensory-functions of consciousness reappear.

The DN I, 223 shows the karma and cognitive-based functions of consciousness. When the Buddha was asked "where do the four great elements completely dissolve?" he first corrected the question, saying that the proper questions to be asked were, "Where do the four great elements not have a firm footing? Where do the discriminations of long and short, small and big, good and bad, disappear? Where do the psyche and the corporeality completely dissolve?" Then the Buddha gave his answers to those questions. He said, "where consciousness disappears, is infinite, is totally given up, there the four great elements do not find a firm footing; there discriminations vanish; there with the cessation of consciousness, both psyche and corporeality are completely dissolved". It seems that the four great elements'

not finding a firm footing refers to the cessation of Karma-based functions of consciousness, and the vanishing of all forms of discriminations refers to the cessation of the cognitive-based functions of consciousness.

Corporeality, Psyche and Consciousness

On the basis of the above analysis of the five aggregates, let us try to find evidence from the Pali canon to establish our suggested threefold division. In the SN II, 114, we read, "depending on psycho-corporeality (*nāma-rūpa*), consciousness (*viññāna*) comes to be, and depending on consciousness, psycho-corporeality comes to be". In this passage, consciousness is understood as something that can be taken separately from psycho-corporeality. In addition, even though psyche and corporeality are often found in the canon in a compound, *nāma-rūpa*, there are also instances where each factor is defined in its own right, without giving any reference to the other or even to consciousness. In my view, this exclusion of consciousness from the other two indicates an early recognition that though these three are interrelated, they are identifiably distinct. The secret of the frequent employment of the compound psycho-corporeality rather than psyche and corporeality, it seems, is to show that the two are interrelated and interdependent. Moreover, the factor of feeling, an aggregate which often appears as a psychic factor, involves both psyche and corporeality. For instance, the SN IV, 232 explains a twofold feeling: physical and mental.

This threefold division is also evident from the AN III, 400 where it states: "psyche is one end, corporeality is the other end, consciousness is in the middle, and craving is the seamstress, for it is craving that stitches it into the arising of this and that form of existence". Thus the text clearly gives separate standing to psyche, corporeality and consciousness.

How this threefold division fits into the five aggregates is not difficult to recognize. Corporeality, as discussed above, is defined (SN III, 62; MN I, 53) in terms of the four great elements and the corporeality that depends on those four elements. Consciousness, on the other hand, is the cognition that is processed through the six sense channels. Both corporeality and consciousness are listed among the five aggregates. Therefore, if we were to delete both corporeality and consciousness from the five aggregates, what remains is the content of psyche. Understood in this way, feeling, perception and formations constitute the psyche. I derive this analysis from the Sammāditthi sutta (MN I, 53) where psyche is defined without referring to either corporeality or consciousness. This sutta analyzes psyche into feeling, perception, deliberation (*cetanā*), contact (*phassa*) and attention (*manasikāra*). Both feeling and perception appear here. Among these factors, the aggregate of formations in the five aggregates is not named as such but as deliberation. In agreement with this, the SN III, 60, as seen above, defines the aggregate of formations in terms of deliberation (*cetanā*). The text says that "there are these six types of deliberation: the deliberation for form, sound, smell, taste, touch and mental images. These are called formations". Therefore, there is no doubt that both deliberation and formations refer to the one and the same and the deliberation or the aggregate of formations is an integral part of psyche. In addition, the fifth century Theravāda commentator Buddhaghosa, in his Visuddhimagga (562), understands psyche as consisting of three aggregates beginning with feeling. Although he does not name the three, considering the popular order of listing, I understand these three to be feeling, perception and formations. Therefore, it seems that Buddhaghosa also assumes psyche to consist of feeling, perception, and formations only.

Even though the issue has not been thoroughly examined by them, E. Lamotte and Ross Reat also hold the same view that I am attempting to establish. Lamotte (1988: 37) says that "mentality (*nāma*) should be understood as the three mental *skandha* excluding *viññāna*: feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*samjñā*) and volition (*samskāra*)". Commenting on the same issue Ross Reat (1990:303-4) says:

There is a tendency among both ancient and modern interpreters of early Buddhism to construe *nāma-rūpa* as a general designation for the two basic aspects of an individual human being, namely consciousness and body. Thereby, the intriguing term is oversimplified and glossed, often with the unfounded assertion that *nāma* represents the four non-material aggregates (*vedanā, saññā, sankhāra* and *viññāna*) and *rūpa*, the fifth aggregate, represents the body. Even Buddhaghosa, who is normally careful to avoid this oversimplification of *nāma-rūpa*, does at one point in the Visuddhimagga suggest that *nāma-rūpa* is a twofold designation of the five aggregates (Vism.14.11). His usual care in this

regard is no doubt a result of the fact that at no point in the early sutta literature is *nāma* defined as the four non-material aggregates. Instead, it is defined as or said to involve, *vedanā*, *saññā*, *cetanā*, *phassa* and *manasikāra*.

In addition, it seems, Edward Thomas also either did not agree with, or felt uneasy about, the traditional understanding of psyche as the non-material (*arūpa*). For instance, he (1933: 97) says: "There is also the term *nāma-rūpa*, 'name and form,' occurring in the Causal Formula. It is equated to the *khandhas* by making *nāma* correspond to the four immaterial *khandhas*, but in the Sammāditthi sutta . . . *nāma* is said to consist of feeling, perception, volition (*cetanā*), contact, and attention, and *rūpa* to consist of the four great elements and what is included in them".

The view that psyche consists of feeling, perception and formations only, however, goes against the popular Theravāda view. For instance, both D.J. Kalupahana and Padmasiri de Silva understand psyche (*nāma*) as that consisting of feeling, perception, formations and also consciousness. I think this Theravāda view has no ground. Kalupahana (1975: 115-6), who was possibly misled by the popular view of the Theravāda and some other Buddhist schools, states that "the psychic personality (*nāma*) is further analyzed into four aggregates: feeling or sensation (*vedanā*, *shou*), perception (*saññā*, *hsiang*), dispositions (*sankhāra*, *hsing*), and consciousness (*viññāna*, *shih*". Kalupahana gives no references to this claim. De Silva (1979:16) writes that "*Nāma* [psyche] is used to refer to the four non-material groups (*khandhas*): these are *vedanā* (feeling), *saññā* (sense-impressions, images, concepts), *sankhāra* (conative activity, dispositions) and *viññāna* (consciousness)". He also gives no references to disclose the sources of his assertion.

Both Kalupahana and De Silva have followed the traditional division of the five aggregates into the material (*rūpa*) and the non-material (*arūpa*). Some later schools of Buddhism including the Theravāda, assuming that psyche of the psycho-corporeality division contains consciousness, maintain, in their analyses of the material and the non-material division, that the non-material and psyche are synonymous. That is to say, according to these schools, psyche (of the psycho-corporeality division) and the non-material are the same. For instance, according to Poussin (1926:94), it is said in the Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakosa* that "*nāma* is the aggregates that are not *rūpa*". Again, in the *Lankāvatārasūtra* (II 124-125 (71-18, 1-4)), we read: *tatra mahāmate catvārah skandhā arūpino vedanā samjñā samskāra vijñānam ca, rūpam mahāmate cāturmahābhautikam bhūtāni ca parasparavilaksanāni*. Here, too, the four aggregates with the exception of corporeality are listed to be non-material. Traditional Theravāda Buddhist scholars, because they follow the texts of the *Abhidhammapitaka* and the Pali commentaries, often take psyche to mean the four immaterial aggregates (See *Buddhist Dictionary* by Nyanatiloka) which are: feeling, perception, formations and consciousness. By doing so they disregard the difference between psyche and consciousness.

Although one may discern psyche as non-material, there is no evidence in the canon to show that psyche comprehends all four non-material aggregates including consciousness. In my view, although the material (*rūpa*) refers exactly to corporeality (*rūpa*), the non-material (*arūpa*) refers to both psyche (*nāma*) and consciousness (*viññāna*). In other words, although both consciousness and psyche can come in the same category of non-material, they are not identical. The two together make up what is called the non-material part of the human being while corporeality is the material or physical part. Psyche and consciousness come under the same category only as far as one speaks to distinguish the material from the non-material or vice versa. However, one should not let this classification disregard the difference between psyche and consciousness. Further, the grouping of the five aggregates into the material and the non-material is just a traditional assumption, for which I find no support in the canon. As far as the Pali canon is concerned, the more important division of the aggregates for the Buddhist practitioner is the fivefold division—corporeality, feeling, perception, formations and consciousness—and the threefold division—corporeality, psyche and consciousness. Psyche then consists of feeling, perception and formations only. Consciousness is a separate aggregate, although its existence depends on psycho-corporeality.

Six Elements

The Dhâtuvibhanga sutta (MN III, 239-40) analyzes the person in four different ways. Of these the first analysis has some relevance to our consideration here. According to this, the person is composed of six elements, namely, the earth (solidity), water (liquidity), fire (heat), wind (motion), space, and more importantly, consciousness. Commenting on the consciousness-element of this sixfold division, Kalupahana (1975:115) says, "The psychic personality is represented by one element, consciousness". I think Kalupahana is wrong again in understanding psyche (*nâma*) to be represented by consciousness[-element]. His mistake here consists of his disregard for the sutta's distinction between consciousness and the consciousness-element. As far as my investigation has demonstrated, no place in the Pali canon identifies psyche (*nâma*) with either consciousness or the consciousness-element. In commenting further on this, Kalupahana says that "this analysis of the human personality into six elements was not as popular as another classification, which reduced the personality to five aggregates...". Even though here Kalupahana observes correctly that the canon considers the personality in terms of six elements less frequently, I believe he fails to recognize the difference between these two analyses.

The analysis into five aggregates presents a complete human person who is now functioning as a world (*samsâra*) bound individual, a "clinging person". The analysis that the person is constituted of six elements, on the other hand, presents the human individual in terms of his basic components. The difference between the aggregate definition and the element definition of the individual, it seems, is analogous to the difference between the contents of a book and the materials of which the book is made. The "contents" of the book indicate the subject-matter; the "materials" of the book, on the other hand, refer to the paper, the ink, and the binding materials. The difference between consciousness and the consciousness-element becomes even clearer in the way they have been presented in the canon. In the aggregate definition, consciousness is an aggregate of grasping, presented together with the aggregates of corporeality, feeling, perception and formations. In the element definition, the consciousness-element is presented along with the elements of solidity, liquidity, heat, motion and space. By this I understand the consciousness-element as one basic element in the world along with the other five, and it differs from others only in so far as it is an immaterial element. As noted above, Kalupahana sees no difference between psyche and consciousness; for him the two are the same. But as far as the textual definitions are concerned, consciousness is consciousness, consciousness-element is consciousness-element, and psyche is psyche. It should not be forgotten here that the Dhâtuvibhanga sutta adds *dhâtu*, "element", to *viññâna* to read *viññâna-dhâtu*, meaning "consciousness-element". Conceived in this way, the human person appears constituted of six basic elements. However, these elements do not describe the person's inner functions, conflicts, qualities, and capabilities, or in brief, cognitive, affective, and volitional functions. The elements do not tell us what the person is and does but what the person is made of.

Since the psyche is not a basic element, it must be understood as an outcome, as a set of functions which result from the concatenation and conglomeration of the six elements in terms of a person or an individual. The AN I, 175-6), another text where these six elements are listed, states that "it is on the basis of the six elements that conception takes place; hence, when there is conception, there is psycho-corporeality. Depending on the psycho-corporeality are the six sense faculties, depending on the six sense faculties is contact, and depending on contact is feeling". The text emphasizes that it is for the person who feels that the Buddha explains the four noble truths: suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation and the way to the cessation of suffering. The six elements explained in this context are the same as those of the Dhâtuvibhanga sutta.

The problem in the world and of the world is not the six elements but the human worldling that these elements contribute to produce. Therefore, the Buddhists endeavor to get rid of what constitutes psyche: feeling, perception and formations. It is psyche in particular that gives these elements a worldly nature. This is made clear in the AN IV, 454 where "the cessation of perception (ideation) and feeling" along with the extinction of cankers is identified as nibbâna here and now. Elsewhere in the canon, nibbâna is explained as a result of tranquilizing all sorts of formations (*sabbasankhârasamatha*). Just as earth, water, heat, and wind elements are dispersed with the physical death, consciousness-element is also

dispersed at the attainment of the complete nibbâna (*parinibbâna*). For that reason, it is stated that with his physical death, an arahant's consciousness disappears or becomes attributeless (*anidassana*). Prior to complete liberation, consciousness manifests and finds footing depending on psycho-corporeality. It seems this is why Buddhist liberation was not regarded as an annihilation: consciousness as an element is not totally extinguished but disappears, unmanifests, or becomes attributeless, having no object to grasp and to manifest. In other words, simply by being a part of the person, the consciousness-element manifests as a consciousness. For consciousness to be present, according to the canon, there must be a mental object, and often these mental objects are provided by corporeality and psyche. However, this explanation does not and should not imply an eternal existence of the consciousness-element known, in the popular sense, as the self or the soul. Just as Buddhism sees the four great elements as impermanent and not-self, so is the consciousness-element because it does not have an independent existence. Without having something to depend on, consciousness is simply not there.

The Four Foundations of Mindfulness

Another interesting and seeming division of the individual, which also implies our threefold division, can be found in the analysis of the four foundations of mindfulness (*satipathâna*): physical body (*kâya*), feeling (*vedanâ*), receptacle-mind (*citta*), and mental factors (*dhammâ*). Edward Thomas (1933: 96) perhaps understood these four to constitute the individual when he commented that "in the four contemplations . . . the individual meditates on himself as compounded of body, sensations, mind and thought". Both early Theravâda Scholars and modern Buddhologists have limited this fourfold analysis to discussing the insight-meditation and have not extended it to discussing the human individual. Although this analysis seems intended to account for the entire human being under the terms of physical body, feeling, receptacle-mind and mental factors, it does not include consciousness. What I mean here is that it is incorrect to take the receptacle-mind mentioned there as consciousness. The two are different from each other. The SN V, 184, for instance, explains how these four come to be and cease to be. Corporeality arises because of the arising of food (*âhâra*), and it ceases due to the cessation of food. Feelings arise due to the arising of contact, and, due to the cessation of contact, feelings cease. Mental factors arise due to the arising of mental reflection, and due to the cessation of mental reflection, mental factors cease. Then the text goes on to say that the receptacle-mind (*citta*) arises due to the arising of psycho-corporeality and with the cessation of psycho-corporeality, the receptacle-mind ceases. An important fact to be noted here is that although the text states that the receptacle-mind arises due to the arising of psycho-corporeality, it does not state that psycho-corporeality arises due to the receptacle-mind. In contrast, the SN II, 114 says that consciousness comes to be, due to psycho-corporeality, and psycho-corporeality comes to be due to consciousness. This means that the canon always distinguishes receptacle-mind from consciousness. In other words, receptacle-mind is a part of psyche; psyche and consciousness are different from each other. Therefore, the fourfold analysis mentioned above is not a complete analysis of the human individual because it does not account for consciousness. The reason that consciousness is excluded, in my view, is that the text considers these four factors as meditational objects, which is to say, they are mental objects of consciousness. A complete inventory of the person must include consciousness. Therefore, the four mental objects—physical body, feeling, receptacle-mind and mental factors—are only the psycho-corporeality on which consciousness depends and vice versa. In the canon, however, where the four foundations of mindfulness are discussed, the threefold division of the person—psyche, corporeality and consciousness—is assumed.

Those who do not distinguish receptacle-mind from consciousness can argue that corporeality (*kâya*), receptacle-mind (*citta*) and feeling (*vedanâ*) in the four foundations of mindfulness represent respectively the corporeality (*rûpa*), consciousness (*viññâna*) and feeling (*vedanâ*) in the five aggregates. They can also say that the mental factors (*dhammâ*) in the four foundations of mindfulness should consist of both perception and formations of the five aggregates because the term *dhammâ* is a wider and inclusive term. Although these arguments seem sound, I have to disagree if they are to equate receptacle-mind with

consciousness. The reason is that, as I argued above, not mentioning consciousness in the four foundations of mindfulness indicates the division of the individual into psyche, corporeality and consciousness.

The following charts of the threefold division—psyche, corporeality and consciousness—of the five aggregates and the four foundations of mindfulness enables us to recognize the significance of consciousness which is not included in the latter.

Threefold Division of the Five Aggregates of Grasping

Consciousness	Consciousness
Psyche	Feeling, perception and formations
Corporeality	Corporeality

Chart 1

Threefold Division of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness

Consciousness	Not mentioned but implied to be the consciousness of the meditator
Psyche	Feeling, receptacle-mind and mental factors
Corporeality	Physical body

Chart 2

Conclusion

Although the five aggregates or psyche, corporeality and consciousness are identifiably distinct from each other, the Pali canon maintains their interdependency. Each aggregate exists because of the other four. However, consciousness is central to human being, without which no individual is to be found. The other four are explained collectively as stations of consciousness because of this centrality of consciousness. The SN II, 114, for instance, says that "consciousness (*viññāna*) depends on psycho-corporeality (*nāma-rūpa*) and that psycho-corporeality depends on consciousness". Psycho-corporeality refers to the aggregates of corporeality, feeling, perception and formations. As such, the four aggregates depend on consciousness and consciousness depends on the four. This mutual dependency of consciousness and the other four and the former's centrality are clearly expressed in the SN III, 53-4. The text says, "consciousness, if it gets a standing, persists by attachment to the other four aggregates; it comes to growth, increase, and abundance with the four aggregates as its object, with the four aggregates as its platform, seeking means of enjoyment". The text then goes on to say, "apart from these four aggregates, it is impossible to show forth the coming or the going or the decease or the rebirth of consciousness". The following simile in the SN III, 54 where consciousness is compared to some seeds also shows this interdependency of consciousness and the other four aggregates. In this context the Buddha asks the monks, "Suppose there are five sorts of seeds which are unbroken, not rotten, unspoiled by wind and heat, capable of sprouting, and happily planted, and there are also enough soil and water, now, would these five sorts of seed come to growth, increase, and abundance?" "Surely, sir", answered the monks. The Buddha continued, "As the earth-element, so should the four stations of consciousness (*viññānatthiti*) [that is, corporeality, feeling, perception and formations] be understood. As the water-element, so should the lure and lust (*nandirāga*) be regarded. As the five sorts of seed, so should consciousness that consists of food be considered". Thus consciousness, the seeds, grows with the help of the other four aggregates—psycho-corporeality—, the soil, and also craving, the moisture.

Again, in the Nalakalāpiya sutta of the SN II, 113-4 this mutual dependency of consciousness and psycho-corporeality is explained by the simile of two bundles of reeds which stand one supporting the other. Both consciousness and psycho-corporeality, the text describes, are neither self-created nor created by others; they are neither both self-created nor created by others nor do they come to be without causes and conditions. They exist depending on each other and as such, with the cessation of the one, the other also ceases. For instance, with the cessation of consciousness, psycho-corporeality ceases, and vice versa. The

text also adds that with the cessation of psycho-corporeality, the six sense faculties also cease.

It is also said that psycho-corporeality comes to be and continues to exist because of consciousness and vice versa. If this is the case, psycho-corporeality ends with the cessation of consciousness and consciousness with psycho-corporeality (Sn, verse 1036). For the cessation of consciousness, formations must be ended. Consciousness which depends on formations is one of the most essential factors of the individual because it is on consciousness that both psyche and corporeality depend and grow.

Consciousness, the MN I, 53-4 says, arises with the arising of formations and it ceases with the cessation of formations; with the arising of consciousness, psycho-corporeality arises, and with the cessation of consciousness, psycho-corporeality ceases. Elsewhere, in the *paticcasamuppâda* analysis, it is said that consciousness depends on formations; psycho-corporeality depends on consciousness and vice versa. With these for the support of my argument, I conclude that though consciousness and psycho-corporeality depend on each other, consciousness comes to be and continues to exist because of formations in particular. Formations, according to the *paticcasamuppâda* analysis, depend on ignorance. Formations appear in the canon in several kinds: karma-formations, ego-formations, activity-formations and sensory-formations. These formations are interrelated and they function and interact with each other due to their mutual support. Thus psyche, corporeality and consciousness which form an individual exist reciprocally; hence, they are interrelated and interdependent.

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Following abbreviated references are to the editions of the Pali Text Society:

AN = The Anguttaranikâya (6 vols);

DN = The Dîghanikâya (3 vols);

MN = The Majjhimanikâya (4 vols);

SN = The Samyuttanikâya (6 vols);

Ud = Udâna.

Vism = The Visuddhimagga

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