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Modernity, Postmodernity and the Analogous Reconstruction of Non-western Societies

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インドその他の非西欧社会が経て来た社会的文化的歴史をポストモダンの理論を用いて理解しようとする傾向が強まっている。これは西欧社会に現れたようなポストモダンの跡をインドその他の非西欧社会の中に追い求め、西欧の観念が支配する世界で生まれたポストモダンの理論に従って非西欧の国々の現実を分析する手法をとることが多い。このような考察・分析は主として類推的考察によるものであり、この類推を可能とする現象はインドのような社会では植民地時代初期から繰返し社会に現れていた、というのが本稿の主張である。植民地時代に見られるモダン（近代性）の諸現象を吟味し、西欧の歴史的経験に普遍的な価値を持たせ、植民地の人間の内部に本来自分たちは異質な要素を無理にも根付かせようとして、どのようにこの類推的考察が使われたかを見ようとする。本稿ではインド最南端の州ケーララ州を特に取り上げ、州の各地に見られる西欧とは断絶したモダニティ現象を例示し、また社会や個人の内部に見られる分裂をも示そうとする。最後に西欧社会のポストモダン理論を現代の非西欧社会に適用した場合の社会的政治的な意味合いを概説する。

There is a growing theoretical tendency to employ postmodern formulations to understand the contemporary social and cultural experiences of India and other non-western societies. Most often, they trace in Indian/non-western societies and cultures indications of postmodernity as evinced in western societies and analyse the realities of these lands in terms of the theories that have arisen within the conceptual realms of western postmodernity. This paper argues that this is facilitated primarily by an *analogical rationality*, which has exercised a persistent presence in social practices and discourses of societies like India since the beginnings of colonisation. The discourses and practices of colonial modernity are examined to see how the principle of *analogical rationality* was employed to universalize western experience and to force the colonised to internalise their own otherness. The paper also looks specifically at Kerala, the southern-most state of India, to see how the modes of analogical rationality have resulted not only in a number of discontinuous discourses of modernity in various domains but also in a crucial fragmentation of social and individual identities. Finally, the contemporary socio-political implications of the application of western postmodern theory to non-western societies are also outlined.

From the mid-1990s, there has been a growing corpus of studies and discussions that attempt to employ postmodern theoretical formulations to analyse the contemporary social and cultural experiences of India and similar non-western societies.¹ Engaged initially with literature and other forms of cultural expression such as films, theatre and the visual arts, they focussed on questions of textual self-reflexivity, metafiction, pastiche, parody and other formal features generally associated with postmodernist art in the West. Gradually, these discussions moved on to the terrain of social experience and began to look at the sprawl of urban culture, the rising tide of consumerism, the growth of information and communication technologies, the increasing domination of daily life by television and other electronic media, and so on, as indications of putative social changes, comparable to the ones that took place in the West, as part of the transformation from modernity to postmodernity.²

A close look at these discussions will inevitably throw up one major feature that seems to be shared by most of them, irrespective of their individual positional qualities or methodological characteristics. They endeavour to trace in Indian/non-western societies, cultures and literatures, signs and patterns accepted as indicative

of postmodernity in corresponding western societies and to analyse the realities of these lands in terms of the theoretical formulations that have arisen within the conceptual realms of western postmodernity. To quote one writer, "The main issue is whether developments are taking place in India that resemble the changes that took place in the United States or in other western countries." ³

Paradoxically enough, despite the avowed postmodern emphasis on the claims of plurality and difference, these so-called postmodern attempts evince a singular tendency to universalise western experience and to approximate and accommodate, if not reduce, into its systems and structures the experiences of other societies and cultures. This phenomenon, much more than being confined to contemporary postmodern discourses alone, has had a longer day. It is facilitated primarily by being grounded upon, what may be called an *analogical rationality*, which has exercised a persistent presence in social practices and discourses of societies like India ever since the beginnings of the processes of modernisation associated with colonisation. By depicting western society as a historically and qualitatively higher or more advanced model, with its practices, discourses, and theoretical/ideological notions desirable and worthy of emulation by other societies, the articulations of analogical rationality in the colonial context worked, on the one hand, as legitimising devices for the exercise of domination by the colonisers and, on the other hand, as the rationale for the acceptance of submission by the colonised. But, perhaps more grievously, and certainly with great critical implications for contemporary Indian and non-western societies and cultures, it also initiated a process that not only instituted a number of discontinuous discourses of modernity in various domains but also resulted in a crucial fragmentation of social and individual identities. Before proceeding to trace the manifold implications of this phenomenon as far as discourses of colonial modernity and (neo-colonial?) postmodernity is concerned, it may be worthwhile to examine the conceptual and methodological modalities that characterise the workings of analogical rationality.

Analogy in Language

Whether as an analytical device or as a criterion for change, it is in the sphere of language that the principle of analogy displays its functions most and receives its best exemplification. The inclination to define and describe linguistic usage and structures in terms of regular analogous patterns and to modify and restructure the irregular into concordance with the systems of the regular is probably as old as language itself. But, as far as formal linguistics is concerned, from the early Greek grammarians and philosophers in the West, who saw analogy and anomaly as the contrary behavioural poles of language, and who through strict grammatical rules attempted to establish analogous regularity in language, and from the ancient Sanskrit grammarians in the East, who through a rigorous adherence to repetitive and analogous sequences of usage patterns, tried to lay down the 'inflexible laws' of language, the principle of analogy has exerted a none too small influence upon the study and analysis of language.

Though the principle of analogy can be seen operating in many spheres of language, it is primarily in three major areas that we can discern its fundamental presence.

1. In traditional linguistics, an older, established and thereby more powerful language was taken as the model for the definition and description of the grammatical and phonetic structures of newer, lately discovered or less established languages. In such endeavours, most often classical languages like Sanskrit, Greek or Latin were taken as models, and other target languages were analysed in terms of structural analogies with them.
2. In the case of historical linguistic change, primarily of grammatical or semantic systems and to a lesser extent of the phonetic system of a language, irregular patterns are changed in accordance with the regular patterns that already exist in language. Here, exceptional or deviant forms that stay out of tune with the "standard" are altered through analogy with patterns that are numerically high, more popular in usage, or considered more acceptable. Initiated by the active intervention of a powerful minority, over a period of time, this process of standardisation percolates down to large sections of the linguistic community.
3. In specific linguistic contexts, new usages or word formations are constructed, based on analogy with already existing models. Though prompted primarily by the individual urge for linguistic innovation or renewal, some of these analogous coinages, at least, are accepted into popular usage.

The fundamental assumption underlying these analogous processes is that "language is essentially regular, displaying symmetries in its rules, paradigms and meanings."⁴ When regularity, thus, comes to be seen as a fundamental quality of language, the idea of normalcy as defined by majority patterns acquires almost unquestionable validity, and all forms of irregularity or deviation need to be limited, contained and suppressed. Such a programme of containment, modification and ultimate erasure of the exceptional and the irregular, in terms of analogy, can proceed only through an omission from consideration of the intermediate stages of evolution of both the model and the target. In other words, by attempting to replicate in the target, a certain model as it obtains at a given point of time; it elides questions regarding the conditions that made them different in the first instance. Thus, by focussing on the product and never on the process of the formation of linguistic structures, the analogical mode effectively ignores the specific and distinctive histories of different usages, constructions and language as a whole. Moreover, such a method also implies a systematic discourse of power, since it involves not only a repression of the indeterminate polyphonous nature of language, but also a none too veiled attempt to privilege and further empower certain established, powerful and majority languages, structures and usages.

Analogy in Colonial Modernity

When we come to colonial modernity, what we discern is the employment of the principle of analogy, as evinced in language, raised to the level of a full fledged rationality and effected in the sphere of social structures, discourses and practices. Herein, the idea of the universal regularity of social structures and cultural systems was taken to be not only desirable but imperative as well.

It would be a theoretical commonplace to state that, with its unbridled dynamism, its forward-looking thrust and its dismissal or marginalisation of tradition, modernity's achievement in the West was nothing less than a major epistemological break and the inauguration of a new social order. Involved as it was in introducing unprecedented and often irreversible change on a massive scale in all spheres of human activity, modernity was the first mode of social organisation to achieve global predominance. Indeed, what characterised the spirit of modernity, more than anything else, were its global assumptions, its dominant view that modernisation was an inevitable and desirable process that simply required the right set of factors. Even though he was writing towards the dusk of modernity's day, W. W. Rostow's (in)famous metaphor captures the idea succinctly: that when certain objective conditions were met and certain criteria fulfilled, any given country or society could gather enough momentum for a "take-off into modernity".⁵ There should be, for instance, mechanical assistance for labour, a greater onus on technology, dependence on inanimate sources of power, a labour market with a professional division of labour, the crucial presence of the entrepreneur and so on. Underdeveloped countries could thus be developed more or less by following a formula that was ostensibly universal, but looked suspiciously western.

Many later theorists, Peter Berger for instance, who see modernity as a whole constellation of characteristics typical of 'modern' societies and not just as an economic, political and technological affair but also as a profoundly cultural one, have questioned how far modernity could be exported to countries that have not yet modernised.⁶ However, in the crucial initial instance, primarily under the impact of post-Enlightenment thought, the assumption of global validity for its values of reason, rationality, progress and the scientific world-view was vouched by the rise of Europe to economic and political power. As Anthony Giddens states, "The growth of European power provided, as it were, the material support for the assumption that the new outlook on the world was founded on a firm base which provided security and offered emancipation from the dogma of tradition."⁷

It requires no comment today that this exportation of modern ideas, systems and social mores, and the consequent incorporation of other societies into the mould of western modernity came about primarily through the agency of colonisation, which in a more fundamental sense was prompted by the growing need for capital accumulation, raw materials, labour power and fresh markets for capitalist industrial production in Europe. If it has already been recognised that the process of modernity in the West was aided by an 'instrumental rationality,' the attempt at modernising colonised societies proceeded principally under the auspices of an 'analogical rationality' that took western society as a model, an original, on the lines of which a state of modernity was to be replicated in the colonies. This was no imitation, because imitation always presupposes an epistemological and ontological distinction between the subject and object of imitation, which is maintained even after the act of imitation, as it was before it. Here, the endeavour was to transform the one, if not into the other, at least in terms of the other. In this sense, it constituted a major epistemological break for the colonised, with their being forced to look at their society and selves in terms of the other, and to define themselves in accordance with the categories received from the thought and value systems of the coloniser. Curiously enough, as far as the colonised were concerned, the process involved an

inverted analogy of sorts because, if in terms of language, the principle of analogy works in most instances towards the transformation of the unfamiliar or the deviant in terms of the familiar, here the transformation was of the familiar in terms of the unfamiliar. The consequent acceptance by the colonised of their own state as one of irregularity, barbarity and historical backwardness and that of the West as one of regularity, civilisation and historical progress resulted in the colonised internalising their own otherness. In other words, they became their own other.

In one sense, it is this process that Homi K. Bhabha, a leading postcolonial theorist, has termed 'colonial mimicry,' based on the Lacanian conceptualisation of mimicry. According to him, mimicry is "one of the most elusive and effective strategies of colonial power and knowledge," used by colonisers to subdue and control the colonised, under the pretext of "civilising missions." Colonial discourses encourage, if not force, the colonised subject to 'mimic' the coloniser, by adopting the coloniser's cultural habits, assumptions, institutions and values. "Colonial mimicry," thus, "is the desire for a reformed, recognisable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite."⁸

While the express aim of colonial modernity was not only the release of colonial societies from their traditional mores, knowledge systems and experiential patterns, but also their reconstruction in the mould of western societies, the fact remains that such attempts took curiously tangential directions. Since it is practically impossible to recreate in another society the very same processes, internal dynamics and structural transformations that constituted the experience of modernity in the West or, in other words, since the history of one society could not be repeated or replicated in another, what actually took place was a conscious and deliberate effort to bring on board the effects, the products, of modernity, most often in a discursive or conceptualised manner. This is to say; the experience of colonial modernity was principally a product-oriented rather than a process-oriented one. These products, in discursive modes, were always already formed, in a finished state, as it were, and held forth visions of a stage to be reached, a target to be achieved, but a target that would change with each subsequent discursive input of modernity from the West. In a sense, it was a never-ending pursuit of one finished state after another, a continuously losing battle, a race after a mirage, where each time you reach out to a target, it is only to realise that the target has not only changed but has also receded farther away.

If one were to take Anthony Giddens' formulation of western modernity as not just the outcome of any single overriding factor, but as a cluster of institutions which include capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and the military, and extend it to include also the institutions of culture, religion, education and so on, then the project of colonial modernity involved the importation of modernity's products in these different western institutions into the corresponding institutions of the colonised countries. However, it remains true that these product inscriptions were not carried out on a *tabula rasa*, but were transcribed into institutional spaces already occupied by traditional, local discourses and practices, which led to complex interactions, entanglements and conflicts between the two, and to tangential shifts of these institutions into newly constituted paradigms which could be identified neither as those of tradition nor as those of western modernity. It was a situation where, instead of a process-to-product mode as in the case of western modernity, a

product-to-process mode was initiated and each institutional domain developed its own scheme, its own variant, of colonial modernity. In the absence of an indigenous, internal dynamic of change or a latent structure of transformation, since the impetus for change came not from within but from without, and in the face of the inability to replicate or reproduce western processes as they were, these different institutional discourses had little to unify them and evolved into disparate discourses with little continuity or coherence among themselves. Ironically, whatever continuity existed was between specific institutions in the colonies and their counterparts in the West.

Kerala: A Case of Discontinuous Modernity

Perhaps the case of the southern province of Kerala, in India, is a good example of this phenomenon. From the end of the nineteenth century, we witness a number of divergent discourses making their appearance in Kerala, each developing in the separate domains of administration, education, literature, the media and so on. They had little in common with each other, so much so that modernity, at best, was experienced here as a set of staggered, uneven and discontinuous discursive phenomena. In the absence of any structural coherence or unity among these different discourses, and given their individual evolutions with little reference to one another, the modernity enterprise in Kerala seems ironically, at least in a limited sense, to fit in with Lyotard's description of the atomisation of postmodern society into distinctive "language games" with their own integral rules.⁹ Far from jumping to the conclusion that Kerala's experience of modernity was essentially postmodern in nature, this should only warn us of the dangers of the facile imposition of western theory to non-western contexts.

The discontinuous nature of the modernity enterprise in Kerala can be witnessed in a number of areas, a specific example being that of literature. From the late nineteenth century on, a variety of themes, forms and conventions were adopted from English into Malayalam literature, which until then had poetic narrative and poetic drama as its major forms. Romantic lyrics, novels and prose dramas made their appearance. While Appu Nedungadi's *Kundalatha* (1887) is arguably the first original novel in Malayalam, Chandu Menon's *Indulekha* (1889) is certainly the first significant Malayalam novel. The English lineage of the novel is acknowledged in the novel's subtitle: "*English novel Matiriyilulla Oru Katha*" (A Story in the Manner of the English Novel). It tells the story of a young middle class woman, Indulekha, educated in English, who asserts her right as an individual to choose the man of her life. It follows closely most of the conventions of the 19th century English realist novel and introduced, perhaps for the first time in Malayalam literature, ideas about bourgeois individualism. The second major novelist to emerge in Malayalam was C.V. Raman Pillai. In his Walter Scott-inspired historical novels about the Travancore dynasty, *Marthanda Varma* (1891) and *Dharma Raja* (1911), he produced grand historical romances about the different Travancore kings and war-heroes who stood up to British imperialism. Even without falling into a mechanical division of society into a socio-economic base structure and a cultural/ideological super-structure, it may be safely surmised that these forms had arisen in Britain and Europe as specific literary responses to structural transformations in society, or as formal articulations of structures of feeling already

present in society. It is in this vein that Georg Lukacs calls the novel expressive of the "transcendental homelessness of man" in bourgeois society,¹⁰ and Raymond Williams identifies the rise of realist drama with a section of the European middle class breaking away from their class habits.¹¹ However, the curious feature to be noted with the changes in Malayalam literature is that, far from being responses to or articulations of existing structures of feeling or intrinsic transformations in society, they were agencies for the introduction, or initiation, of such structures. In other words, the modernist venture in literature, at the time of its inception, had little to do with any other area of social life, and instead of expressing an already existing social ethos, was instrumental in its initial infusion into society.

On a more general level, these disparate discourses of modernity have also made a major contribution to the making of the so-called 'Kerala model,' a model of development that has interested and intrigued economists and sociologists alike. In one sense, Kerala is the standout state of India. Its male literacy rate is near universal and its female literacy rate is 87%, as compared with 68% in China. The single most important statistic about Kerala is its fertility rate. At 1.6%, Kerala's rate of population growth is less than the United Kingdom or France (at 1.7%) and China (with its one-child policy, still at 1.9%). Infant mortality is very low and life expectancy is 76, both comparable to western nations.¹² It goes without saying that most of these were possible because of an extensive service sector and social welfare programmes that were well in place. The key features of Kerala's model of development have been based on solidly humanist principles of education, public co-operation with responsible non-government organisations (NGOs) and the empowerment of women. No doubt, the growing presence of leftist political ideas and organisations from the 1950s, and a succession of left-wing governments since 1957 have had a favourable effect too. However, the fact remains that all this was in the near total absence of most of the economic integers such as extensive industrial production, advanced technology, mechanical assistance for labour, or capital-intensive businesses, which are usually associated with development. It was, in essence, a case of social modernity without the economic basis that had come to be expected for it, in tune with classical instances like Europe.

The case of Kerala is distinctive also in that the uneven, discontinuous nature of colonial modernity in the different domains had grave implications for social and individual identities. With each discourse of modernity carving out its own space within the subjectivities of individuals and thus with the constitution of disparate, even discordant, spheres within each subjectivity, identities were fragmented and broken asunder into a number of disparate entities, each engaged in discourses or practices which had little reference to or continuity with the others. This was further exacerbated by the fact that, as in most of India, the discourses of colonial modernity were felt primarily in the institutions of the public domain, while private spheres were left largely unaffected.¹³ This led to a disengagement, a schizophrenic disjunction, between the public and private identities of individuals. It effectively meant that a person engaged in various positions and practices of modernity in his/her public role could continue to maintain a private identity given over to traditional or pre-modern practices, habits and customs. To mention an obvious example, the high incidence of persons committed in a professional capacity to the

modern calls of capital, industry, science, technology and so on, but who, at the same time, in their private lives preserve ardent faith in the truth values of religion, astrology, traditional belief systems, and so on stands manifest testimony to the extent of this phenomenon.

In this context, it has to be noted that one discourse that was a partial exception to the above by having an impact on both private as well as public social identities was that of the caste-reform movements. From the 1920s on there arose a number of movements within different castes/communities, which in the initial instance were aimed at internal reform through the eradication of age-old superstitions, irrational rituals and conventional life practices, and which later led to a radical questioning of the hierarchical assumptions basic to a caste society. Though indirectly influenced by modern ideals of humanism, it was essentially an indigenous phenomenon that rose in response to certain intrinsic traits in Kerala society. Here, there was no model to follow, no western discourses to be reproduced analogically, no colonial encouragement for mimicry. It was immensely successful too, in that, it was able to do away with most of the evils associated with the caste system, such as untouchability, rigid hierarchies, the caste based division of labour, and so on. However, due to a variety of historical reasons,¹⁴ not the least of which was the absence of a coherent or consolidated modernity enterprise, far from realising the logical ends of a fully secular, non-communal society, many of these caste-based movements have of late lapsed into sectarian, casteist denominations, which dovetail ever so smoothly into the already traditional, pre-modern matrix of private identities. In this light, it appears as no coincidence that most latter-day and even contemporary traditionalist, revivalist discourses, particularly of the Hindutva variety in Kerala, address more than anything else the sphere of private or personal culture, and pitch themselves most often in relation to individual bodies, the spaces they inhabit and the objects surrounding them.

The Contemporary Scenario

Coming to the contemporary scene, that the analogical rationality that informed colonial modernity still continues to bear upon discourses even today is vouched by many present-day attempts to trace, in Indian and other non-western societies, signs of post-modernity on lines similar to those of the West. However, such theoretical propositions beg a question. If postmodernity is to be considered primarily as a crisis and exhaustion of western modernity, would societies like India, which have alternatively been the 'other' and the 'object' of western modernity, experience and respond to that crisis in the same way as the West does? In other words, will the breakdown of a western modernity, which had paved the way for their being colonised and dominated, be received by non-western societies in the same manner as the West? Despite the obvious, and to a great extent valid, arguments about the effects of globalisation, the information society and the media age that would come up in response to the above questions, what one cannot wish away from these postmodern theoretical articulations is a latent tendency for totalisation that unambiguously harks back to the agenda of modernity. It is again being assumed that the experience of the West has perforce to be the experience of the rest of the world. A further paradox is that by taking the West as a sustained

model even for the search for postmodern tendencies in non-western societies, these enunciations, ever so surreptitiously, try to usher back into systems of thought the very notion of an abiding centre, and into social analysis a Euro-centric paradigm, which western postmodernity itself has been at great pains to dismantle. The modalities of this discourse prompt one to suspect that it constitutes one of the theoretical visages of neo-colonialism and an endeavour to re-assert through oblique theoretical means the western hegemony that had been weakened with the wane of colonialism. Indeed, one is constrained to wonder whether this is a transmuted version, in the domain of theory, of the monetary debt trap that most third-world countries were lured into, under the ostensible guise of assistance, but with a hidden agenda of domination.

The perilous political implications of such versions of the postmodern will become fully evident only when it is realised that it has also become a conducive terrain for theoretical denominations which advocate a revivalist return to the pre-modern, or a gloomy acceptance of the demise of all hopes of emancipation, or even a celebration of the ultimate insignificance of all practice. Lest it be assumed otherwise, it may be stated that one is not suggesting a total rejection of the entire corpus of postmodern formulations. Certainly, the postmodern critique of the structures of authority, its understanding of the relations between discourse and power, and its emphasis on the validity of plurality and difference are all of immense relevance to the contemporary political context, both national as well as global. However, the question that confronts us today is whether, and how far, we shall be able to realise the liberatory possibilities of the postmodern, while overcoming new threats from without and within our nations. Perhaps the answer to this only time can tell. In the meanwhile, our responsibility lies in unrelentingly criticising our own discourses and practices in the hope of transforming them.

Notes

¹ Most of these discussions were/are conducted primarily in Indian languages, especially Bengali, Hindi and Malayalam. However, for a sampling in English, see M. Nanda, "The Science Wars in India," *Dissent*, Winter 1987, pp. 78-83; R. Banthiya, *From Historicity to Postmodernity: A Case of South Asia*, New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1994; A. Ghosh, "Postmodernism and Indian Cinema," *Views, Reviews, Interviews*, <<http://www.geocities.com/PostmodernismAndCinema/index.html>> 16 May 2001; Thomas Palakeel, "Malayalam Literature: A Brief Survey," *Kerala Journal*, <<http://www.gotop10.com/KJ/malayalasaahityam.html>> 16 May 2001.

² Despite contestations, it has generally been accepted, at least among postmodern theorists, that 'the postmodern' refers above all to the crisis and exhaustion of modernity. There has also been a distinction drawn between *postmodernism*, where the accent is on the cultural and the intellectual, and *postmodernity*, where the emphasis is on the social. *Postmodernism* questions most of the key commitments of the Enlightenment, including faith in 'meta-narratives' like progress or providence and the notions of a linear, teleological history. It also rejects notions of 'foundationalism,' the view that science is built on a firm base of observable facts, thereby questioning the ability of any human discourse to represent reality truthfully. Another feature has been the exchange of the printed book for the TV

screen, "the migration from word to image, from discourse to figure, or, as the plastic wordsmiths prefer, from logocentrism to iconocentrism" (David Lyon, *Postmodernity*, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p. 7). *Postmodernity*, on the other hand, has to do with a new kind of society coming into being, or a new stage of capitalism being inaugurated. In both cases, two issues are crucial: the prominence of new information and communication technologies, facilitating further extensions such as globalisation; and consumerism, perhaps eclipsing the conventional centrality of production. For further reading, J. Baudrillard, *The Mirror of Production*, St Louis: Telos Press, 1975; Z. Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, New York: Routledge, 1991; Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, New York: Basic Books, 1976; I. Hassan, *The Postmodern Turn : Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture*, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1987; F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, New York: Duke University Press, 1992; E. A. Kaplan (ed.), *Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories and Practices*, London: Verso, 1988; J. F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984; B. Turner (ed.), *Theories of Modernity and Postmodernity*; London: Sage Publications, 1990.

³ P. K. Poker, *Utharadhunikathayude Keraliya Parisaram* (Postmodernity in the Kerala Context – Volume in Malayalam), Calicut: Poorna Publishers, 1996, p. 6.

⁴ David Crystal, *The Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 404.

⁵ W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, p. 23.

⁶ Peter Berger, *The Homeless Mind*, Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1974, p. 37.

⁷ Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 48.

⁸ Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, London: Routledge, 1994, p. 85.

⁹ Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, p. 21.

¹⁰ Georg Lukacs, *The Theory of the Novel*, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971, p. 19.

¹¹ Raymond Williams, *Drama from Ibsen to Brecht*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 18.

¹² Bill Cooke, "Rationalism in the Third Millennium," *The New Zealand Rationalist & Humanist*, Autumn 2000, p.8.

¹³ Unlike the experience of some colonised societies in Africa and South America, despite nearly two hundred years of colonisation, colonial influence in India was limited primarily to the political, administrative, educational and professional fields. It was never really able to penetrate into the personal and familial realms. A case in point would be that of the spread of Christianity; in spite of sustained missionary efforts, the rate of conversion was never substantial, with Christians comprising not more than 2.6 percent of the population, according to the 1981 census.

¹⁴ One major reason has been the fact that, in a highly competitive and closely fought electoral system, many communities and castes were/are being wooed by different political parties as 'vote banks,' which have led to their consolidation as pressure groups. In addition, the governmental policies of positive discrimination for employment and education, aimed at the welfare of socially backward groups, have been largely based on caste, and have had the unfortunate fallout of institutionalising the very caste system that they were designed to combat.