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The Japanese Security Policy after the Cold War

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This paper makes a theoretical analysis of Japan’s security policy in the post-Cold War era. More specifically, it critically examines existing major theories of Japan’s security policy, particularly neo-realist, constructivist, and neo-institutional theories. Neo-realists argue that Japan is just like other states that are highly concerned about their own relative military power. Neo-realists also think that there is a real possibility that Japan will try to develop a military power commensurate with its economic power and may even go nuclear. In contrast, constructivists and neo-institutionalists argue that Japan is largely a peaceful state and is unlikely to become a major military power in the near future due to normative and institutional constraints on its security policy. The paper reveals the problems of these theories and considers alternative approaches.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War generated a strong interest in Japan’s security policy and led to a lively debate on its future. One group of scholars known as neo-realists argued that Japan would attempt to become a major military power with a real possibility of going nuclear while other groups of scholars, constructivists and a variant of neo-institutionalists, argued that Japan was highly unlikely to become such a military power because of the norm of anti-militarism and pacifism deeply rooted in its society and because of institutional constraints that would prevent changes in security policy. The constructivists and neo-institutionalists point to Japan’s slow and limited military response to the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 as major evidence that supports their contention, whereas the neo-realists can point to Japan’s proactive military response to the security threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs that have proceeded rapidly after the Cold War. Then, which assessment is more plausible?

My contention is that the assessments made by the neo-realists, the constructivists, and the variant of neo-institutionalists are all inadequate. In fact, Japan’s responses to the Gulf Crisis and to the North Korean threat do not strongly support any of these assessments. In this paper, I will carefully analyze these two cases in order to highlight the problems of the existing approaches to Japan’s security policy and show the importance of taking into account the domestic political underpinnings of Japan’s security policy which the existing approaches overlook. Furthermore, through these analyses, I will illuminate the promise of a new systemic approach known as postclassical realism which can better explain recent changes in Japan’s security policy. I will also explore the desirability of combining this approach with the kind of sub-systemic approach that focuses on the
impact on security policy of domestic politics, particularly the change in the
distribution of power within and among parties.¹ In order to provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the security policy of Japan and other countries, I
will propose a combined use of these systemic and sub-systemic approaches.

A Review of Contending Approaches

Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara in their article, as well as Thomas U.
Berger in his, argue that Japan’s limited military expansion cannot be explained by
systemic approaches such as neo-realism, and they propose sub-systemic
approaches that they think can present a better analysis and explanation.² Highly
critical of neo-realism, they point out that its expectation that Japan will seek to
possess military power commensurate with its economic power has not been
realized and argue that it is unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future.

Katzenstein/Okawara argue that Japan’s military expansion has been limited
because of the constraints posed on its security policy by the organizational
structure of the Japanese government and by the deeply contested norms of military
security in Japan.³ Berger attributes the limited military expansion to the culture or
norm of anti-militarism, which is strongly rooted in Japan and shared by the
political, administrative, business elites and the general public.⁴

Mercantile realists such as Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels and
postclassical realists such as Stephen G. Brooks, in contrast, try to resolve the
question of Japan’s limited military expansion with a systemic explanation.⁵
Mercantile realists maintain that Japan has limited military expansion since it has
been concerned primarily with economic power and since its military interest has
been subordinated to its economic interest.⁶

Many postclassical realists argue that Japan’s military policy, both its limited
military expansion and its more hawkish stance in the 1990s, can be explained in
terms of the probability of threat it has faced, as opposed to the mere possibility of
threat on which neo-realists base their theories. They also explain these policies in
terms of the maximization of Japan’s total national power including both military
and economic powers as opposed to the priority attributed to military power by
neo-realists. In the postclassical realist framework, a state responds to external threat
only when the threat is not just a matter of possibility but when the threat becomes
more real. Thus, postclassical realists, in contrast to neo-realists, do not expect a state
to prepare for the worst case scenario based on the mere possibility of threat.
Further, postclassical realists expect a state to pursue maximization of national
power, i.e., military and economic powers. They do not expect a state to give a
permanent priority to either military or economic interests, whereas neo-realists and
mercantile realists expect a state to give such precedence to military interest and
economic interest, respectively.

My response to these recent major theoretical efforts to explain Japanese
security policy is multifold. First, the attack on systemic theories by
Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger is unreasonable and not sufficiently substantiated.
It is inappropriate to dismiss systemic theory as a whole just because neo-realists
cannot offer good explanations for Japan’s limited military expansion. Second, even
though I agree with Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger that a sub-systemic level explanation for Japan's security policy is needed, their versions of explanation are not good enough, primarily because of their neglect of an important intervening variable: domestic politics among policy makers, particularly elected ones, who act rationally and strategically to maximize their interests under certain institutional and normative constraints. Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger do identify structural and normative constraints on Japanese security policy. Yet they fail to recognize it is not such a constraining policy environment per se but policy makers that make and change policy, and policy makers can sometimes overcome various structural and normative constraints. I will support these contentions with a case study of Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis, which is examined also extensively by Katzenstein/Okawara and to some extent by Berger, as well as a second case study of Japan's response to the North Korean threat.

My third contention is related to the first one. We need both systemic and sub-systemic approaches in order to offer a more comprehensive explanation for the security policy of a country. In my case study of Japan's response to the North Korean threat, I will show that postclassical realism seems the most effective of the systemic approaches available, but that it needs to be supplemented by the sub-systemic approach that I presented above as an alternative to Katzenstein/Okawara's and Berger's approaches. This is the approach that focuses on the domestic politics played by policy makers, particularly elected politicians and their parties, acting rationally and strategically to maximize their interests, under certain institutional and normative constraints.

**Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis**

The early 1990s witnessed a major change in Japan's security policy, namely Japan's lifting of its ban on the overseas dispatch of the Self Defense Force (SDF) for military missions. This new development was triggered by the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991. Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger, however, do not regard the change of Japan's security policy in response to the Gulf Crisis as particularly significant. In fact, they argue that Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was very slow and limited in its extent. Katzenstein/Okawara maintain that the slow and limited response "illustrates with great clarity the rigidity of Japan's security policy even though the pressure from the United States and rapidly changing conditions in the international system made policy flexibility appear advantageous to many." Then, they attribute the policy rigidity to Japan's domestic political structure and to deeply contested norms of military security. Berger similarly argues that Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis illustrates "Japan's reluctance to contemplate any expansion of its military role in the world, despite external pressures to do so." He ascribes that reluctance to Japan's postwar culture of anti-militarism.

It is true that Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis was slow and limited, yet "slow and limited" does not necessarily mean "insignificant." In fact, it was significant in that it resulted in the first dispatch of Japan's military force even though the constitution prohibits it from possessing any armed forces and past governments had adhered to a ban on sending the SDF on overseas missions.
Leaving aside this issue at this point, I would like to examine the explanations for Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis offered by Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger.

First of all, it should be pointed out that it is inappropriate for Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger to state that the importance of external factors to change in Japan's security policy. After all, it was the Gulf Crisis, an external factor, that became the initial trigger for the change in Japan's security policy under question here. Also, the case of Japan's policy response to the Gulf Crisis does not support their claim that structural approaches such as neo-realism have little explanatory capacity with regard to Japan's security policy. After all, the Gulf War was not perceived as a major threat to Japanese security. Nor did it threaten to reduce Japan's relative power in Asia-Pacific. Therefore, neo-realists cannot, in fact, argue that Japan's limited response to the crisis is consistent with their expectation.

Yet, it is true that structural approaches cannot fully explain why it took so long for Japan to respond and why Japan responded to the Gulf Crisis in the particular way it did. Here, Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger are right to consider sub-systemic or domestic-level approaches, examining what kind of domestic factors affected government response to external change. Their problem, however, lies in their choice of domestic factors on which they base their approaches. Katzenstein/Okawara focus on political structure and norms whereas Berger focuses on the culture of antimilitarism. Those factors are constants, which constrain policy choice, rather than variables. Therefore, one can refer to those factors in order to explain policy continuity, arguing that policy did not change because those constraining factors remained unchanged. The question, then, is how one can explain policy change with unchanged factors. That is logically impossible. Then, Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger could argue that the factors they focus on are not constants but variables and that Japan's policy did change a bit and slowly because the factors changed a bit and slowly. Yet this creates another question of why those factors changed.

There is a way to solve their problem. It is to incorporate a new explanatory factor: politics among policy makers, particularly elected policy makers and their parties. This is a crucial explanatory factor or variable that is neglected by Katzenstein/Okawara and Berger. Also, because of this neglect, their approaches are highly apolitical. After all, it is elected policy makers that play a crucial role in policy choice. Considering that Katzenstein/Okawara clearly state that they are concerned with policy choice, their neglect of the role played by elected policy makers is rather surprising. In short, one has to examine closely how policy makers respond to the change in domestic and external environments.

**Domestic Political Factors Behind Japan's Response to the Gulf Crisis**

**The Fate of the Peace Cooperation Bill**

The Gulf Crisis began when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Strong international pressure, particularly by the United States, urged Japan to make a contribution to the international effort to solve the crisis led by the U.S. and authorized by the United Nation Security Council.
At that time, the Japanese government was led by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. His party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), dominated the powerful lower house, the House of Representatives (HR). Kaifu was considered to be a dove and a supporter of the peace constitution. Initially, he preferred the option of creating a new, special unit separate from the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to make personnel contributions to the multinational force led by the U.S. acting with a mandate from the United Nations (UN). In fact, on August 29, his administration decided on an aid package that included a 100-member medical unit that was to consist primarily of doctors, nurses and medical experts from public institutions. Thereby, he tried to honor the June 1954 diet resolution banning the overseas dispatch of the SDF and the traditional government interpretation of the constitution and the SDF Law as articulated by the Suzuki administration in October 1980. This interpretation suggested that, if the goals and missions of the UN forces concerned did not involve the use of force, then the participation of the SDF in such forces would not be prohibited by the Constitution, but could not be allowed since the current SDF Law did not assign such missions to the SDF.

Yet in October 1990, the Kaifu administration introduced a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill to create a United Nations Peace Cooperation Corps, including SDF personnel among its members, that would participate in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) conducted and directed by the UN or by other countries authorized by the UN. He was under strong pressure from party heavyweights such as Shin Kanemaru who was considered to be the "King Maker" and was the president of the Takeshita faction, the largest in the party, and the hawkish Ichiro Ozawa who at that time assumed the powerful position of the general-secretary of the LDP and was a leader of the Takeshita faction. Also pushing for change were an intra-LDP group called the "defense tribe," which was a supportive voice for SDF officers, and the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which disliked the idea of forming a new unit that would create new financial burdens. Interested in expanding Japan's influence in the world and in the UN, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also supported the idea of allowing the SDF's participation in UN PKOs although it initially supported Kaifu's idea of creating a separate unit as a first step to achieve its goal. Kaifu was also under strong pressure from the U.S., which considered Japan's contribution until then as "too little, too late." Despite Kaifu's objection, the inclusion of the SDF personnel in the UN Peace Cooperation Corps was decided by the LDP at the urging of Ozawa and the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) while Kaifu was on a tour to the Middle East. He was outraged by the decision, but could not overturn it because of his limited power. Coming from a small faction within the LDP, his premiership depended on the support of the larger Takeshita faction.

It should be noted that the MOF and the MOFA, along with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), are those agencies that Katzenstein/Okawara think constrain the independence of the JDA. They argue that this "colonization" of the JDA by other civilian agencies serves as "a strong bias against any military interpretation of Japan's national security requirement," and thus imply that this colonization makes it likely for Japan to play a greater military role. However, the policy making process described above casts serious doubt on this proposition. Surely, the colonization of the JDA reduces its institutional
autonomy and complicates decision-making process within the JDA. It however does not necessarily mean that the colonization of the JDA puts on the brakes to Japan’s playing a greater military role. As shown above, it was the MOF and the MOFA that supported the idea of allowing the SDF to participate in UN PKOs over the idea of creating a separate unit that was favored by Prime Minister Kaifu and was more consistent with the spirit of the peace constitution.

The UN Peace Cooperation Bill, however, met strong objections from the opposition. Here, particular attention needs to be given to the fact that at that time the opposition had the majority in the upper house, the House of Councilors (HC).21 Also, there were LDP members who were cautious about sending the SDF overseas. The public also reacted negatively, and this drove Kaifu’s approval rate down. Kaifu became particularly concerned about the negative impact on his administration’s popularity because two important elections were upcoming; a by-election for the HC on 4 November 1990 in Aichi prefecture from which he himself was elected and a mayoral election in Okinawa on 18 November 1990. Winning those elections, particularly the by-election, was considered to be important for the survival of the Kaifu administration.22 These factors made it very difficult for the administration to strongly support the bill and eventually led to its abandoning of the bill on 8 November 1990, two days before the end of the extra-ordinary Diet session. As an alternative, on the same day, the ruling LDP signed an agreement with the Komeito (CGP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) on forming a unit separate from the SDF to participate in UN PKOs.23

On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678 that authorized UN member nations to take whatever measures necessary to restore the international security of the Gulf region if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 (more specifically, 2:00 P.M. on 16 January, Japanese time). Understandably, this development put further pressure on Japan to decide what kind of personnel contribution it would make if Iraq did not meet the withdrawal deadline and if the U.S. led multinational forces took action. Against this background, the 120th ordinary Diet session started on 10 December 1991, about a half month earlier than usual. The Kaifu administration, however, could not decide on Japan’s personnel contribution before the start of the attack on Iraq by the U.S. led multi-national forces at 8:44 A.M. on 17 January 1991 (Japanese time). The beginning of the attack, of course, made it urgent for the government to decide on Japan’s action.

Japan’s response after the breakout of the Gulf War between Iraq and the multi-national forces was quick, in stark contrast to its indecisiveness until then. This is noteworthy and seems to defy the stereotype of Japanese government’s decision-making as being slow. On the very day the war broke out, Kaifu ordered Defense Agency Chief Yukihiko Ikeda to prepare a dispatch of SDF airplanes for the evacuation of expected war refugees. The use of SDF airplanes was justified on the grounds of the SDF Law Article 100 on the transportation of national guests and the like.24 Of course, this was clearly an arbitrary interpretation of the law. On 25 January 1991, the Kaifu administration formally adopted a special government ordinance at its cabinet meeting to use up to five C130 airplanes of the Air SDF (ASDF) for the transportation of refugees from Amman, Jordan and Damascus, Syria
to Cairo, Egypt. Kaifu was initially reluctant to dispatch of the SDF planes. Yet, without any other quick action available to take, he accepted the idea of the use of the SDF strongly promoted by Ozawa.25

The rapidity of this decision is quite significant. Yet, what is more significant is the nature of the decision and the manner in which the decision was made. After all, this was to be the first ever overseas dispatch of the SDF to take part in international military operations.26 Such an important decision was made behind closed doors by a small number of LDP leaders and was reached with no Diet deliberation at all. The government avoided Diet deliberations with its arbitrary interpretation of the SDF Law. Virtually the same thing happened when the government decided to dispatch minesweepers to the Gulf after a formal truce was reached on 11 April 1991. Five days after the truce, the JDA chief Ikeda ordered the Chief of Staff of the Maritime SDF (MSDF) to prepare for the dispatch of minesweepers. Then, the Kaifu administration made a formal decision on 24 April 1991 at a cabinet meeting and a national security council meeting. Again, there was no Diet deliberation made. The decision was justified on the grounds of the SDF Law, Article 99, that MSDF disposes of mines and other explosives following the order given by the JDA chief. The government interpreted this law in such a way as to authorize its dispatch of the MSDF minesweepers to the Gulf.27

Both of the decisions to dispatch ASDF airplanes and MSDF minesweepers contradicted the LDP-CGP-DSP three-party agreement to create a unit separate from the SDF to take part in UN PKOs. They were also inconsistent with the traditional government interpretation of the SDF Law that the law does not allow the SDF to conduct such overseas missions. Considering that the mission of the SDF is self-defense, it seemed to be an over-stretching of the concept of self-defense to conduct missions in such a remote place as the Gulf, even if it was to secure a safe passage of oil tankers to and from Japan, which is a crucial bloodline for Japan. In order to allow such a mission for the SDF, the legal status of the SDF should have been changed.

As Katzenstein/Okawara also mention, Japan’s dispatch of its minesweepers to the Gulf was promoted strongly by the decision of the German Government in March 1991 after the cease-fire that ended the war, and despite the constitutional ban on the dispatch of its forces outside the NATO region. Thus, Germany was under a similar constraint. Germany was also a country that sought a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Not surprisingly, the MOFA, a primary supporter of Japan’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, began to support a similar action on the part of Japan.28 The MITI was also supportive of dispatching minesweepers to secure the safe passage of Japanese tankers. Apparently, it was under pressure from the Oil Industry Association, the Maritime Shipping Association, and the Federation of Economic Organization (Keidanren), which is an influential business association.29 MITI’s decision was influenced by other considerations such as post-war business opportunities in the Gulf region and the potential negative impact of military inaction on the Japan-US trade. The LDP defense tribe representing the interest of the JDA and the defense industry as well as the LDP commerce/industry tribe representing the interest of the business also supported the dispatch.30 The public campaign for the dispatch by the business and
LDP politicians seemed to have had an impact on the public opinion. According to one poll conducted in late March 1991 and sponsored by a foundation headed by a former chief of the National Police Agency, the majority of the respondents were supportive of the idea, though a plurality (37%) gave it a reluctant support.\(^{31}\) In this context, Kaifu gave a green light to the dispatch, although he was initially cautious about it.

Katzenstein/Okawara, having examined the political context in which Japan’s dispatch of minesweepers was decided, note that “This episode indicated that the categorical opposition to the overseas deployment of the SDF had lost some of its persuasiveness in Japanese domestic politics.”\(^{32}\) Yet, they do not explain what really caused the loss, nor do they show clearly how this case study supports their theoretical proposition that Japan’s choice of security policy is constrained by the domestic political structure, such as the colonization of the JDA by other ministries and by deeply contested norms of military security.

In fact, the Japanese government’s decision-making on the dispatch of minesweepers shows that rather than constraining the JDA and security policy making as a whole, the MOFA and MITI, which colonized the JDA, strongly promoted the dispatch. One could even say that those two ministries, not the JDA or the SDF, advocated it most strongly. With regard to contested norms of military security, surely such a normative disagreement exists in Japan and even within the LDP. Yet in the policy-making leading to the minesweeper dispatch, the normative issue did not become salient. And those who advocated a utilization of armed forces, namely the SDF, prevailed easily. Katzenstein/Okawara’s theoretical framework cannot explain policy changes of this kind. In order to do so, one needs to examine political games played by policy makers, particularly elected ones. In particular, one needs to identify both the distribution of power among policy makers and their preferences.

Passage of the PKO Bill

On 19 September 1991 the Kaifu administration introduced the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Bill (hereafter the PKO bill) to the House of Representatives. The bill allowed the participation of the SDF in UN Peacekeeping Force (PKF) without a prior Diet approval. The use of weapons was limited to self-defense. The constitutionality and Diet approval of the participation of the SDF in PKF became major contentious issues. Not surprisingly, the passage of the bill was not easy. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kaifu was succeeded on 5 November 1991 by Kiichi Miyazawa, another dovish veteran politician, since Kaifu’s term as the LDP president expired and he decided not to run for re-election. The bill finally cleared the Diet on 15 June 1992. The final bill required a prior Diet approval for the participation of the SDF in UN PKF and a freeze of SDF’s participation in the front-line operations of PKF.

Why did it take as long as nine months for the government to pass the bill? Is it because of “the constraints of Japan’s organizational structures and the normative context in which its security policy was defined,” as Katzenstein/Okawara argue?\(^{33}\) A closer examination of the case shows us that an explanation based on those constrains is inadequate. Also, their theoretical framework cannot explain why the
participation of the SDF in PKF was eventually approved by the Diet, although the UN Peace Cooperation Bill was discarded before. It simply cannot explain this change.

Preceding the introduction of the PKO bill in September 1991, there was a G-7 summit in London on 16 July 1991 which was joined by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The summit adopted a statement that it would promote a system of collective security conducted by the UN itself or a group of nations authorized by the UN Security Council. In short, the leaders agreed to promote the type of collective security action conducted by the multinational force in response to the Gulf Crisis. It is natural to imagine that Kaifu felt urged to prepare Japan for future action under this framework. Apparently, he had another reason to rush to prepare for the SDF participation in UN PKF: A UN peacekeeping operation was expected to take place in Cambodia in the near future.34

The major reason that it took about nine months for the LDP government to pass the bill had more to do with LDP’s lack of control in the upper house than with the organizational structure of the Japanese government or the deeply contested norms of military security among policy makers. The LDP tried to win the support from the CGP and the DSP. Both parties were basically supportive of SDF participation in UN PKF. However, the three parties disagreed over Diet approval of such a participation, which the DSP demanded whereas the LDP and the CGP objected. The LDP and the CGP tried to win the support of the DSP with a proposal of limited Diet approval: a requirement of Diet approval for the SDF to participate in the UN PKF over two years. Still, their negotiations failed. The Miyazawa administration, wanting to pass the bill by the end of the Diet session in mid December, then, convinced the CGP to help the LDP railroad the bill on 27 November since, together with the CGP, the LDP could command a majority in the upper house.35

This motion, however, met strong criticism from other opposition parties, particularly the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) and from the public. In response, the government returned the bill to the special committee on UN peace cooperation, revised the bill to include the provision it offered to the DSP, and then finally passed the bill in the lower house on 3 December. Then, there surfaced a controversy over Miyazawa’s involvement in insider trading of stocks. This scandal hindered the Miyazawa administration from passing the bill in that Diet session.36

The next Diet session began in January 1992. Yet the passage of the bill was not easy this time either. Apparently in an attempt to restore its public image - damaged by helping the LDP railroading the bill in November 1991 - the CGP on 4 February proposed to the LDP that the participation of the SDF in PKF be frozen, which the DSP opposed, while the DSP kept its demand of Diet approval of the participation, which the CGP opposed.37 Meanwhile, the UN PKO in Cambodia led by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) began in March, putting pressure on the Miyazawa government to pass the bill.38 What complicated the LDP’s negotiation with them is that the CGP, with which the LDP could command a majority in the upper house, became unwilling to support the bill just by itself and without other parties’ endorsement as well, as a result of its bitter
experience in November. In an attempt to win the support of the two parties and pass the bill, the LDP made a further compromise, accepting their respective demands of freezing the participation of the SDF in front-line operations of UN PKF and requiring Diet approval for the participation. Then, it urged the two parties to accept the proposal by using a stick: threatening to dissolve the lower house in such a timing as to have elections for the lower and upper houses at the same time, which would put the small parties at a disadvantage. With these sticks and carrots, the Miyazawa administration finally managed to pass the bill on 15 June 1992. The law, then, took effect on 10 August 1992. One month later, on 19 September 1992 the Japanese government dispatched its SDF to the UN PKO in Cambodia.

In the above analysis, I examined the validity of two sub-systemic level approaches to Japan’s security policy: the constructivist approach of Berger and the constructivist/neo-institutionalist approach of Katzenstein/Okawara. They presented their approaches because they found that existing systemic approaches, particularly neo-realism, were unable to offer cogent explanations for Japan’s limited military expansion. My analysis shows that the case of Japan’s responses to the Gulf Crisis did not substantiate their approaches. It also reveals the ineffectiveness of the two approaches as sub-systemic approaches. Further, as a sub-systemic approach that overcomes their insufficiency, I put forth an approach that gives particular attention to domestic politics played by policy makers, especially elected ones, and substantiated its validity with the case of Japan’s response to the Gulf Crisis.

In the next section, I will first examine two systemic approaches, mercantile realism and postclassical realism, which were presented in response to the apparent inability of neo-realism to explain Japan’s security policy. Using Japan’s response to the increase in the North Korean threat as a case study, I will show the limited applicability of mercantile realism and the effectiveness of postclassical realism. Secondly, I will bring back a sub-systemic approach that focuses on domestic politics played by policy makers under institutional and normative constraints and illustrate its ability to offer explanations supplementary to postclassical realist explanations.

The Rise of North Korean Threat

The balance of power that existed in Northeast Asia disappeared with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, the security environment of the region became unstable. Mutual concerns arose among the states in the region about others’ reactions to the new security environment. Yet, the impact of the systemic change was not the same for everyone. It was North Korea that was most negatively affected. North Korea responded to the new environment with military expansion and diplomatic brinkmanship. It was this new policy of North Korea that promoted the change in Japan’s security policy.

During the last few years leading up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost financial and military support from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, from China. North Korea’s two patrons, instead, sought economic ties with South Korea and established diplomatic relations. In contrast, North Korea failed to normalize its relations with the United States and Japan, South Korea’s
major allies. In addition to the severe erosion of Soviet and Chinese support, North Korea suffered from the failure of its economic development. These external and internal factors escalated North Korea’s sense of insecurity.

In order to cope with this national crisis, North Korea resorted to a diplomacy of brinkmanship. It accelerated its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development programs. With these programs, North Korea tried to enhance its military and economic security, which had declined after the Cold War. Development of nuclear arms and ballistic missiles not only improved its military security but also enabled North Korea to blackmail the United States, Japan, and South Korea and reap economic concessions from them. North Korea’s military expansion as a result of the end of the Cold War, thus, destabilized the security of the region.42

Japan’s Response to North Korean Threat

The impact of North Korea’s military expansion on other states differed, however. It was Japan that felt most threatened. Japan felt particularly threatened by North Korea’s development of power projection capabilities, namely ballistic missiles, more so than its nuclear weapon development per se. Possession of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction only becomes a real threat when the country in question has power projection capabilities.43 North Korean missiles, possibly with nuclear warheads, can now reach anywhere in Japan. The U.S. did not become as alarmed since most of its territory still remained out of the range of North Korean missiles. South Korea was not as concerned either since North Korea’s long-range missiles did not add much to its offensive capacity against the adjacent South Korea. Further, Japan felt particularly threatened and vulnerable since it had very limited offensive capacities to deter or counter North Korean attacks in stark contrast to the strong offensive capabilities possessed by the United States and South Korea.

Moreover, North Korea’s two missiles (or rockets as they claim) - one of which landed in the Sea of Japan, while the other flew over Japan - were perceived by the Japanese as real military threats against Japan. These incidents and the intrusion of North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters in late March 1999 made the Japanese think that North Korea’s use of force against Japan was not a mere possibility but indeed could happen with a higher degree of probability.

With this real sense of threat, Japan did take counter measures, which is in conformity with the logic of postclassical realism that a state responds to an increase of threat rather than a mere possibility of threat. On 22 December 1998, the Japanese government headed by Keizo Obuchi of the LDP overrode a long-standing Diet resolution regarding peaceful use of space and decided to domestically build and launch four spy satellites despite heavy financial requirements and concerns expressed by China and South Korea. Further, in March 1999, Defense Agency Director General Hosai Norota told a Diet defense panel that Japan had the right to make pre-emptive military strikes if it felt that a missile attack would be imminent, and this was apparently intended as a warning against North Korea launching another missile.44 But, as many experts point out, Japan does not have sufficient
ability to carry out pre-emptive strikes. For instance, the SDF does not even possess an air-to-air refueling aircraft that would enable ASDF to conduct long-range missions. This situation needed to change. Otherwise, Norota’s statement would be empty. In fact, after the North Korean missile launch in 1993, the Japanese government began a serious consideration of acquiring airborne refueling capability and finally made a decision to obtain the capacity at a meeting of the National Security Council convened in December 1999.

Alongside these independent measures, Japan moved to solidify its alliance with the U.S. by revising the guidelines for their security cooperation of 1976 and adopting new guidelines for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in September 1997, thereby offering greater support to U.S. military actions in the areas surrounding Japan. Also, Japan committed itself to a joint project with the U.S. to develop a theater missile defense (TMD) system in September 1998, thus breaking away from its previous reluctance to make such a commitment.\textsuperscript{45} Further, Japan increased its security cooperation with South Korea in contrast to its reluctance to forge a closer security tie with the country during the Cold War. At the Obuchi-Kim summit in Tokyo in October 1998, the two leaders promised to further increase their security cooperation to handle the North Korean threat. Japan’s eagerness to improve its relations with South Korea was reflected in its decision to include in the summit joint statement its first-ever written apology to the South Koreans for its oppressive colonial rule. The summit was followed by such cooperative measures as the establishment of a military hotline in May 1999 and the first joint naval search and rescue exercise in August 1999. Further, Japan has been coordinating its policy to thwart North Korea’s missile program with the U.S. and South Korea through regular and ad hoc security talks. To counter North Korea’s attempt to develop nuclear weapons, Japan strengthened its ties with the U.S. and South Korea, which can be seen in their joint management of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), established in March 1995 to prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons development.

The series of Japanese military responses to the North Korean threat clearly conform to the expectations of postclassical realists, but not to that of mercantile realists. In fact, Japan’s behavior vis-à-vis North Korea cannot be explained by mercantile realism because Japanese responses do not fit into its narrow focus on economic relations. Further, Japan’s responses to the North Korean threat cast serious doubt on the validity of one of the key propositions of mercantile realists: “when trade-offs must be made, techno-economic interests may be pursued at the expense of political-military interests.”\textsuperscript{46} A particular behavior of Japan relevant to this point is Japan’s decision to make a significant financial commitment to the TMD project despite its previous reluctance to do so because of its skepticism over the technological viability of the project and its large expected cost. Japan’s change of mind is all the more significant because it happened when the country was in the midst of the worst recession in its post-war history and when public concern was mounting over massive and growing central and local governmental deficits. When the behavior of Japan, the prototypical techno-economic state for mercantile realists, does not confirm to their premise, its validity naturally comes under serious doubt.\textsuperscript{47}
Japan’s hawkish military responses to the North Korean threat also cast doubt on the efficacy of Katzenstein/Okawara’s neo-institutionalist and constructivist framework and Berger’s constructivist framework. First, they cannot explain why Japan decided to expand its military capability and strengthen its military ties with the United States and South Korea. Put differently, they cannot explain why military expansion can happen even when there exist institutional and normative constraints that work against it. Second, Japan’s public outcry resulting from North Korea’s provocative actions, which promoted Japan’s hawkish responses, suggests that Japan’s culture of anti-militarism, which Berger thinks is deeply rooted in Japan, does not seem so strong as Berger and others have thought.48

Domestic Political Factors Behind Japan’s North Korea Policy

Japan’s military responses to increased threats from North Korea discussed above show the high degree of validity of postclassical realism. Yet, its explanation of the Japanese responses in terms of the probability of threat needs to be supplemented by a sub-systemic level explanation that takes into account the domestic politics conducted by policy makers, particularly elected ones and their parties, who act rationally to pursue their interests. Japan’s rather hawkish responses to North Korea, such as its decisions to strengthen its military capability and to strengthen its military alliances with the United States and South Korea, were not just results of the increase in North Korea’s threat as perceived by Japan, which is a focal point for the postclassical realist. The hawkish military responses of Japan were influenced by domestic politics as well.

A major domestic political factor that enabled the Japanese government to make more hawkish responses without facing much opposition in the Diet is the decline of the JSP. The party’s seats in the lower house declined from 136 out of 512 in 1990 to 70 out of 511 in 1993 and to a mere 15 out of 500 in 1996 while its representation in the upper house dropped from 71 out of 252 in 1992 to 38 out of 254 in 1995 and to 13 out of 252 in 1998. Further, it should be noted that the weakening of the JSP also contributed to a decline in public opposition as well as its political influence on national policy. In general, public awareness of an issue and public criticism at government handling of it are promoted by a group, particularly a political party, which initiates criticism and articulates the problematic nature of government handling. Without a strong group taking such a leading role, public criticism and opposition movements generally cannot gain much force.

In fact, the JSP was the major symbol and vanguard of pacifism in Japan. Back in 1960, the JSP played a leading role in the opposition to Premier Kishi’s attempt to revise the Japan-U.S. security treaty that resulted in a massive nation-wide demonstration. After the dramatic event, the JSP as major opposition party continued to gather pacifist voices and put pressure on LDP-led governments not to expand Japan’s military role by arbitrarily interpreting the peace constitution. Had it not been for the JSP, public discussion on the revision of the constitution would not have become a taboo and remained so until recently.

Even after the Cold War, the JSP remained an influential political force for some time, though its strength declined. In fact, it affected Japan’s Korea policy as well. When the LDP lost its thirty-eight year-long power and a coalition government

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headed by Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan New Party (JNP, formed in May 1992) was formed by opposition parties in 1993, the JSP was the largest party in the ruling coalition.\(^4\) While Hosokawa was in office, the crisis over North Korea's suspected nuclear development program broke out and in February 1994 the Clinton administration requested Japan to provide military support for a possible naval blockade to enforce economic sanctions against North Korea.\(^5\) This presented a great opportunity for Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the Shinseito (the Renewal Party (RP)), a party splintered from the LDP in June 1993, and other hawkish elements in the coalition, who pushed for the passage of the UN PKO law in 1992, to further advance their agenda of expanding the role of the SDF. Yet, as the largest and indispensable member of the coalition, the JSP effectively thwarted such a development.

When Hosokawa resigned amid a financial scandal after eight months in office in April 1994, Ozawa maneuvered and succeeded in garnering enough support of other conservative parties within the coalition to have Tsutomu Hata of his party chosen as a new head of the coalition government. A major agenda item of Ozawa and his supporters was a revision of the existing SDF Law, so that the SDF could join U.S.-led economic sanctions against North Korea.\(^5\) However, no matter how eager they were on the issue, the prospect of their success was little, given the strong opposition of the JSP to any SDF role in Korea that would violate the constitution.

Even worse, Ozawa's secret maneuver to form a Diet group, Kaishin, with two other coalition parties, the JNP and the DSP - suddenly after the selection of Hata as a premier - angered the JSP and caused the departure of the JSP from the coalition and thereby the collapse of the Hata administration in June 1994. The angry JSP decided to join hands with the LDP and the Shinto Sakigake (the New Party Harbinger (NHP), a splinter party from the LDP formed in June 1993), which had left the anti-LDP coalition when Hata was selected as a new leader. The JSP formed a coalition government with them, with its party leader Tomiichi Murayama as a new premier.\(^5\) As a result, Ozawa and his supporters lost the opportunity to pursue their hard line North Korean policy as members of the government.

In 1994, the JSP joined hands with the LDP, its erstwhile archenemy, and its party leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became premier. Then, the party made a Copernican change, abolishing its basic party stances that the Japan-U.S. security treaty and the SDF are unconstitutional. Surely, the conversion was a functional necessity since Murayama could not abrogate the treaty and had to serve as the commander-in-chief of the SDF. As dramatic as the official policy change was, the JSP maintained its pacifist stance and policy of defending the peace constitution. Consequently, as an essential member of the coalition government and with its leader serving as a premier, the JSP could stop LDP's attempt to expand the role of the SDF in a way that would violate the constitution.\(^5\)

Yet, the JSP's dramatic policy change on the Japan-U.S. alliance and the legality of the SDF after joining hands with its long-time archenemy, the LDP, gave the public an impression that it compromised its principles in its lust for power. Surely, this move disillusioned many of its supporters and was tantamount to self-destruction of the party as the icon of pacifism in Japan. As a result, the party lost
public support and won a mere fifteen seats out of the total 500 in the 1996 lower house elections, as opposed to seventy seats it won in the preceding elections in 1993.\textsuperscript{54} This decline of the JSP, then, amounted to a loss to Japan's pacifism of its major pillar and erstwhile vigor.

In contrast, the JSP's coalition partner, the LDP, increased its seats in the lower house from its pre-election strength of 211 to 239, leading to the formation of an LDP minority government led by Ryutaro Hashimoto in November 1996.\textsuperscript{55} It was this Japanese government, led again by the LDP, that adopted the new guidelines for the Japan-U.S. security treaty to strengthen their security ties in September 1997 and decided on hawkish responses to the 1998 missile launch by North Korea (during the Obuchi administration formed in July 1998). Constructivists examining Japan's security policy seem to miss the crucial role the JSP played in the context of coalition politics and fail to capture the significance of the fall of the JSP as a political force upholding pacifism in Japan.

Constructivists are, however, not the only ones the validity of whose argument became questionable in the light of Japan's countermeasures to the North Korean threat. Japan's decisions to launch four spy satellites, to develop the TMD system, and to acquire airborne refueling capacity also raise a serious question about the institutionalist argument advanced by Katzenstein/Okawara.\textsuperscript{56} Those decisions show that a strong political will can overcome institutional constraints, such as the resistance to costly projects and acquisition of expensive equipment for budgetary reasons by the MOF, which colonizes the financial section of the JDA. Further, the qualitative change of developing a new military capability should be noted. The quantity of defense budget does not tell the whole story. How the money is spent matters. In this respect, the decision to acquire airborne refueling capacity is particularly significant.

Katzenstein/Okawara might point out that their constructivist and neo-institutionalist contention is supported by the difficulty the Japanese government had in getting a budget for the refueling airplanes whose acquisition it decided on. Yet, a closer examination of this case reveals that the difficulty originated from domestic politics rather than from institutional constraints or mere normative disagreement. Thus, this case supports my argument that elected policy makers play a crucial role in making decisions by strategically responding to both domestic and international changes under institutional and normative constraints.

Following North Korea's first test-launch of a missile in May 1993, Japan included in its 1996-2000 Mid-Term Defense Program a plan to study and decide on the acquisition of airborne refueling capacity.\textsuperscript{57} The JDA pushed for the acquisition and tried to secure a budget for it in the government budget plan for the year 2000. Yet, on 16 December 1999, the ruling coalition decided not to include the acquisition in its budget plan. There were concerns within the government over provoking China and North Korea as well as the appropriateness of the refueling capacity for Japan whose SDF is supposed to be exclusively defensive.\textsuperscript{58}

The LDP was largely supportive of the acquisition. The main stumbling block was the CGP. On 10 December 1999, the LDP's National Defense Division convened and decided to urge the government to allocate a budget for the acquisition, maintaining that "no more delay of the introduction of airborne refueling planes
should be made in order to protect the security of the nation.\textsuperscript{59} However, the CGP, the second largest party in the LDP-CGP-Liberal Party (LP) ruling coalition, expressed the strongest reluctance, although there were also some LDP members who exhibited reluctance.\textsuperscript{60} The CGP has been more cautious about expanding the role and capacity of the SDF. Since the LDP lacked the majority in the upper house and needed the support of the CGP, the LDP decided not to push for the acquisition this time.\textsuperscript{61}

The story does not end here, however. The government heeded the concerns of the CGP and some members of the LDP and gave up allocating a budget for the airborne capability in the 2000 budget, but the very next day, on 17 December 1999, it convened a meeting of the National Security Council chaired by Prime Minister Obuchi and decided to introduce airborne refueling planes promptly during the term of the next Mid-Term Defense Program (2001-2005). Then, Obuchi expressed his view that the refueling capacity was needed.\textsuperscript{62} The final decision is significant in itself. Yet, the process leading to it reveals the importance of domestic politics centered on ruling parties and their leaders as a key intervening variable between change in domestic and international environments and policy change. If the government had consisted of the LDP alone or just the LDP and the more right-wing LP headed by Ichiro Ozawa, then, a budget might well have been allocated for airborne refueling planes.

Conclusion

In this paper, I evaluated existing systemic and sub-systemic approaches to Japan’s security policy with two case studies: Japan’s responses to the Gulf Crisis and to the North Korean threat. Neo-realism, mercantile realism, and postclassical realism are those systemic approaches while Berger’s constructivist and Katzenstein/Okawara’s constructivist/neo-institutionalist approaches are those sub-systemic approaches.

My study found that postclassical realism was the most effective systemic approach but needed to be supplemented by a sub-systemic approach to give a better explanation. My analysis also revealed problems of the two sub-systemic approaches and found that they could not supplement postclassical realism well. Then, as an alternative to the two sub-systemic approaches that can play such a complementary role, I presented a sub-systemic approach that focused on domestic politics played by policy makers, particularly elected ones, who respond to changes in domestic and international environments under institutional and normative constraints.

As a systemic approach, postclassical realism was found most effective because it makes more realistic assumptions that states try to balance against real increase in threat, not just mere increase in military or economic power of other states and that states define their national interests in terms of both military and economic interests without giving precedence to one or the other. These more realistic assumptions enabled postclassical realists to overcome the problems encountered by neo-realists and mercantile realists in explaining Japan’s security policy: Neo-realists were unable to explain why Japan’s military power has
remained disproportionate to its economic power due to their assumption that states
give a higher priority to military over economic interests, while mercantile realists
ran into a problem in explaining Japan’s hawkish responses to rising North Korean
threats because they assume that states give a higher priority to techno-economic
interest than military interest.

As a sub-systemic approach that can supplement postclassical realism, I
presented and substantiated an approach that focuses on domestic politics played by
policy makers, especially elected ones, who respond to changes in both domestic
and international environments under institutional and normative constraints. This
sub-systemic approach, as indicated, does pay attention to institutional and
normative constraints. Thus, it does not totally dismiss the insights provided by
Berger’s constructivist and Katzenstein/Okawara’s constructivist/neo-
institutionalist approaches. Rather, it incorporates their insights. Also, it overcomes
their inability to explain change as opposed to continuity of policy.

In order to explain policy change, it is essential to examine domestic politics
played by policy makers, particularly elected ones. Surely, the choice of politicians is
constrained by institutional structure and their normative preferences. Yet, it should
not be forgotten that it is possible for them to overcome institutional constraints or
even change institutional structures that constrain their behavior. Also, elected
policy makers are not totally constrained by their normative preferences. Their
preferences are not limited to normative ones. They have other preferences,
particularly maintaining and expanding their political power, which can and often
times do take precedence over their normative preferences. Further, it should be
noted that which norm prevails in the parliament depends on the strength of the
supporters of different norms in the parliament. It is not sufficient to say that there
exist conflicting norms of security policy among policy makers. We need to go
further than that and examine how the power of politicians with competing norms is
distributed in the parliament in order to understand the impact of norms on policy
choice.

Postclassical realism and the sub-systemic approach I presented here are not
developed exclusively to explain Japanese security policy. They are applicable to
other cases as well. As I have illustrated in my study, a combined use of these
systemic and sub-systemic approaches has a lot of promise.

Notes

1 Systemic approaches examine the impact of the international system on states, for
instance the impact of the lack of the world government on state behavior. States are
the unit of analysis. The influence of domestic factors on state behavior is left
unexamined. Sub-systemic approaches try to explain state behavior primarily with
these domestic factors.

2 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures,
Norms, and Policies,” International Security 17(4) (Spring): 84-118; Thomas U. Berger,
“From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism,” International
Security 17 (4) (Spring 1993): 119-150.

3 Katzenstein and Okawara, pp. 84-118.
4 Berger, pp. 119-150.


6 Heginbotham and Samuels, pp. 171-203.

7 Berger is primarily concerned with normative constraints, though.

8 Katzenstein and Okawara, pp. 108-111.

9 Ibid., p. 111.

10 Ibid., p. 129.

11 Ibid., p. 85.

12 After the February 1990 HR elections, the LDP had 53.7% of the seats, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) 26.6%, the Komeito (CGP) 8.8%, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) 3.1%, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) 2.7%.


14 “The SDF Law limits operations of the SDF to Japanese territory and territorial waters, with the exception of overseas port calls for ceremonial reasons and naval exercises with U.S. forces.” The Japan Times (WIE), 27 August-2 September 1990, p. 22.


17 “Gov’t completes aid package,” The Japan Times (WIE), 3-9 September 1990, p. 3.


20 Katzenstein and Okawara, p. 97.

21 After the July 1989 HC elections, the LDP had 43.3% of the seat, the JSP 27.0%, the CGP 8.3%, the JCP 5.6%, and the DSP 3.2%.

23 Sasaki, pp. 57-58. Meanwhile, before the end of the Diet session, Japan did decide to make financial contributions: on 30 August 1990 it decided to provide $1 billion for the multinational forces led by the United States, and, on 14 September 1990, $2 billion for Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan

24 Sasaki, p. 67.

25 Ibid., p. 67.

26 No SDF C130 was actually dispatched because there were no such request for such an action by any international organizations or foreign governments!


28 Katzenstein and Okawara, p. 108.

29 MITI's close relationship with the oil industry is indicated by the fact that the Arabian Oil company, a Japanese company, was headed by Keiichi Ogawa, a former administrative vice-minister of the MITI.

30 Sasaki, pp. 116-119; Katzenstein and Okawara, p. 108.

31 26% of the respondents considered the option as natural (tozen), 37% reluctantly supported it (shikatanai), 29% objected to it, and 8% said that they don't know. Sasaki, p. 117.

32 Katzenstein and Okawara, p. 108.

33 Ibid., p. 111.

34 On 23 October 1991, a comprehensive truce pact was signed by warring parties in Paris.


36 "Recruit scandal haunts Miyazawa," The Japan Times (WIE), 16-22 December 1991, pp. 1 and 5.

37 The CGP leadership was criticized by its rank and file members and the Sokagakkai, a Buddhist organization that is the backbone of the CGP. Sasaki, p. 203; Takashi Kitazume, "LDP, centrists seek PKO compromise," The Japan Times (WIE), 11-17 May 1992, pp. 1 and 6; The CGP was at odds with the DSP on the latter's idea of placing Japanese peacekeepers under U. N. command. "Komeito at loggerheads with DSP," The Japan Times (WIE), 4-10 May 1992, p. 4.

38 Yasushi Akashi, the head of the UNTAC, gave a strong support to the PKO bill, urging Japan to send as many personnel as possible, including SDF personnel, to participate in UNTAC activities. Sayuri Daimon, "Tokyo asked for $200 million to help defray UNTAC costs," The Japan Times (WIE), 25-31 May 1992, p. 3.
39 "Komeito at loggerheads with DSP," The Japan Times (WIE), 4-10 May 1992, p. 4.
40 "LDP threatens general election if vote on PKO bill is disrupted," The Japan Times (WIE), 1-7 June 1992, p. 6.
41 The USSR and China normalized their relations with South Korea in September 1990 and August 1992 respectively.
42 North Korea has reaped profit from its missile export to such countries as Iran, Pakistan, and Libya.
43 Conducting terrorism using bio/chemical weapons does not require such a capability, though.
46 Heginbotham and Samuels, "Mercantile Realism," p. 191.
47 Note also that the development of the four satellites amounted to a virtual increase of defense spending because they are officially considered as multipurpose satellites, not spy ones, and therefore the budge for that is not included in the budget for defense.
48 "Tokyo says preemptive strike in order only if N.K. clearly provokes," Korea Herald, 17 March 1999.
49 After the July 1993 HR elections, the LDP had 43.6% of the seat, the JSP 13.7%, the Shinseito (RP) 10.8%, the CGP 10.0%, the JNP 6.8%, the JCP 2.9%, the DSP 2.9%, and the Sakigake (NHP) 2.5%. The new coalition government included the JSP, the RP, the CGP, the JNP, the DSP, the NHP, and the United Social Democratic Party (USDP).
51 Qingxin Ken Wang, "Japan's Search for influence in the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War: Aspiration and Constraints," East Asia 16 (1-2) (Spring-Summer 1997).
52 Ishikawa, Sengo Seijishi, 192.
53 The LDP, headed by dovish Yohei Kono this time, did not eagerly press for an expansion of the role of the SDF during this time either.
54 In June 1996, four month prior to the elections, the JSP changed its name to Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDP).
55 Earlier in January 1996 Hashimoto succeeded Murayama to head the LDP-JSP-NHP coalition government.
56 The recent qualitative change of Japan's defense capability has not pushed up its defense budget beyond the traditional threshold of one percent of the GNP. The budget for the development and launch of four spy satellites is not included in the defense budget because they are considered to be "multipurpose" satellites, instead of spy ones. Therefore, it amounted to a virtual increase of the defense budget for the national defense.
58 Asahi Shimbun, 16 December 1999.
59 Yomiuri Shimbun, 10 December 1999.
60 Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 December 1999; and Asahi Shimbun, 16 December 1999.
61 The Liberal Party, founded by Ozawa in January in 1998, supported the budget allocation. Before the 2000 HR elections, the LDP, the LP, and the CGP had 271, 18, 42 seats respectively in the 499 member HR. After the 1998 HC election, the LDP, the LP, and the CGP had 103, 12, and 22 seats in the 252 member HC. The LDP-LP coalition government was formed in January 1999 and the LDP-CGP-LP coalition government was formed in October 1999.